HUMAN ORGANIZATION

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Correspondence:
Anthropology in Public Health Programs

Articles:
Engineers and Workers: A Case Study
William F. Whyte

Button-Down Collar Culture:
A Study of Undergraduate Life
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Reviews of the Literature

VOLUME 14 **NUMBER 4**

PUBLISHED BY THE SOCIETY FOR APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY

THE SOCIETY FOR APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY

THE Society for Applied Anthropology was incorporated as a scientific society in 1941 under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Its primary objective is "the promotion of scientific investigation of the principles controlling the relations of human beings to one another, and the encouragement of the wide application of these principles to practical problems."

Services

With the establishment of central offices, the Society is undertaking to provide informational services to members. These include the maintenance of a roster of those working in the field of applied anthropology, an up-to-date record of research facilities and projects, a file of current job opportunities, and liaison with sources of research and fellowship funds.

Among the more important services, the Society arranges consultant relationships with other institutions, in particular with agencies of the Federal Government. In order to obtain the services of one consultant or more, any organization, whether Federal or private, may contract with the Society to undertake a survey or other study and the Society in turn employs the consultants. An arrangement of this kind is mutually advantageous, since it is difficult for private individuals to enter into such agreements with governmental institutions. Among contracting agencies in the past have been the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, United States Department of the Interior and the United States Department of State.

The Clearinghouse for Research in Human Organization was established for the purpose of keeping members in close touch with current research projects in all of the fields of human organization. The services of the Clearinghouse are available to all members of the Society who wish to find out if others are working on research similar to their own, that they may profit from an exchange of ideas and experiences, and avoid unnecessary duplication. The Director of the Clearinghouse publishes the quarterly, *Human Organization Clearinghouse Bulletin.*

Meetings

The Society holds its own annual meetings as well as meetings held in conjunction with other scientific societies. These meetings are designed to encourage members and others working in the field of applied anthropology to develop a common practice and point of view and to share and evaluate the methods and generalizations deriving from research. The differing specialties combined under applied anthropology ordinarily have separate sessions at the annual meeting. They include: Industrial Relations, Social Psychiatry, Social Work, Agricultural Extension, Anthropology in Government, Inter-Group Relations, and Community Organization.

Publications

A quarterly journal, *Human Organization,* is published by the Society and is devoted to the presentation of research results in the several fields of specialization of the members. It also provides a summary evaluation of the literature from the point of view of the needs of the practitioner, and a continuing description, by the editors, of the latest methods and techniques for field investigators.

The quarterly, *Human Organization Clearinghouse Bulletin,* is an invaluable aid to anyone working in the field of human organization. Both research in progress and published research are presented in systematic and analytical reviews under the headings of institutions and professions. The reviews are cross-indexed for easy, rapid reference.

HUMAN ORGANIZATION

VOLUME 14

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WINTER, 1956

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Correspondence

On the Effective Use of Anthropology in Public Health Programs

To the Editor:

" 'By experience,' says Roger Ascham, 'we find out a short way by a long wandering.' Not seldom that long wandering unfits us for further travel, and of what use is our experience to us then?"[1] At least it may enable us to cry to those who came after, "This way is good. Use it, I implore you!"

When, after a "long wandering" in the field of Maternal and Child Health among Malay, Chinese and Indian peasant and working-class people in a tropical country, I first read Dr. Foster's report, "A Cross-Cultural Anthropological Analysis of a Technical Aid Program,"[2] I was astounded at the similarity of so many of the situations and beliefs he describes to those I had encountered in a very different part of the world. Here were the ideas I had found so puzzling—the "hotness" of coffee and the "coldness" of tea, and other foods or medicines; the strange ways that "Wind" could enter the body and create havoc; the need to cover the baby's fontanelle or the toddler's umbilicus (though the rest of the body could be most engagingly naked!); the anxiety about the proper disposal of the placenta; the sympathetic but "superior" attitude of some of the personnel in hospital or clinic. Since then I have read other publications by different anthropologists interested in Public Health, and have always found something that would have been immensely useful to my work, if only I had known it at the right time—10 or 15 years ago. Certainly if I had seen one description[3] of the position and practices of the traditional midwife in a valley in Peru, my approach to what seems to me now a fantastically similar situation in some of the rural areas of Malaya would have been entirely different, and probably much more effective.

In his thoughtful article, "On the Effective Use of Anthropology in Public Health Programs,"[4] Adams points out that the anthropologist can offer the public health worker two things—a point of view, and a knowledge of certain techniques. There is no doubt in my mind as to which is the more important. I can forgive myself for not knowing the anthropological techniques—after all I was medically trained. I find I cannot forgive myself for the lack of "the thoughts of the imagination" which prevented me from respecting a system of medical beliefs which were "foreign" to me, and apparently ineffective as far as child health was concerned.

Luckily, my Scottish upbringing made it easy for me to recognise the mothers as women the same as myself trying to cope with the problems of bringing up a family, pleasing a husband, earning a living, and fitting into life as we found it—and this created a definite bond of sympathy between us which mitigated, to some extent, my regrettable intolerance of blue dye on the wrists as a cure for some childish complaint. But the bond was not strong enough to withstand absence and time, and 10 years later I found things being done much the same as they had always been done and that indeed "knowledge without thought is labour lost."

We who have worked without the skilled guidance which the anthropologist has to offer and realise our past inadequacies and failures can, more than anyone, appreciate fully the enormous advantages to be gained from such cooperation. I would, therefore say to all my fellow, but younger and more fortunate, workers in Public Health, and particularly in Child Welfare, "use the help of the anthropologists wherever possible. It will save you time, money, energy, disappointment, and frustration. It will also lessen your regrets when you too are 'unfit for further travel.' But like everything else, this knowledge and guidance have their price. No longer will you be able to educate by 'teaching'—confident in your own scientific rightness and the ultimate triumph of proven facts. You will have to use your brains and imagination as well as your factual knowledge to fit this knowledge to the pattern that the anthropologist has disclosed. You will have to behave less like a tram and more like a trolley-bus—clinging to your factual life-line, but manoeuvring with patience and skill—and this will take much time and energy. And worst of all, you will have to learn humility, which is difficult for the medical profession—not because we are innately more arrogant than others, but because our training, traditionally and even today, lays tremendous emphasis on the production of 'curers' who tend to rely on the oracular utterance which cannot be questioned. Unhappily, our oracular utterances cut no ice in the countries where most of the world's children live — and have to be replaced by more patient explanations and discussions. The price is high, but not unreasonable. If we would help other people to change their habits, it is perhaps only fair that we should begin by changing our own."

Sincerely yours,

ANNE BURGESS, M.B., CH.B.,
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Malayan Medical Service,
Acting Deputy Director, General
Council for Health Education, London.

1. Thomas Hardy, *Tess of the d'Urbervilles,* Chapter 15.
2. Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., 1951.
3. Edward Wellin, "Pregnancy, Childbirth and Midwifery in the Valley of Ica, Peru." Mimeographed Memorandum, Ica Anthropology Project sponsored by WHO and Minister of Public Health and Welfare, Peru, 1953.
4. See *Human Organization,* Volume 13, No. 4, 1955.

Engineers and Workers:

A Case Study

*William F. Whyte**

The Problem

In modern industry, it is generally the engineers who organize the technological change process. As staff experts, they design and develop new machines and processes; as supervisors of the work force, they direct the operation of the new work-ways.

The workers are affected by all such changes, but they are not the mere passive agents of change. They operate the machines and directly control the processes; they react to the changes imposed upon them in ways we can discover.

Both efficiency and harmony within the organization depend upon the adjustments made between workers and management's most prominent innovators, the engineers.

Our story covers roughly five years (1938-1943) in the history of an aviation gasoline plant—one small segment of a rapidly growing independent oil company.

This is not a case of one technological change. We will examine, chronologically, the impact of a whole series of technological and other changes upon worker-management relations. This will lead us also to follow the course of a struggle to unionize the workers. Finally, we will see how these events affected a single worker, Joe Sloan, whose problems with the company came to a crisis dramatically at the end of my period of observation.

This story of individual, group, and organization should cast light upon a number of questions of broad, general interest in American industry:

1) Why do workers join unions?

2) How should changes in technology and process be introduced?

3) How do such changes affect the personal adjustment of the individual?

4) How can management effect the best combination between the workers' operating skills and the engineers' technical knowledge?

5) What sorts of supervisory behavior lead to harmonious or conflict relations between foremen and workers?

6) To what extent can the foreman influence workers' relations with the company?

* Dr. Whyte is with the N.Y.S.S.I.L.R., Cornell University.

Establishing the Technological and Human Organization

The engineers were experimenting in the development of a new process to make high octane gasoline out of natural gas. For some time the company had been making regular automobile gasoline out of natural gas, but producing iso-octane for aviation gasoline presented special difficulties.

To advance this project, the engineers set up a small pilot plant. To operate this plant, they arranged to have placed on the jobs men who were selected entirely on the basis of their presumed skill and intelligence. Thus the pilot plant was staffed with a group of eager young operators who in some cases had less seniority (working time with the company) than many fellow workers who were receiving the same pay.

When the Hi-Test plant was set up in 1938, the process was still considered difficult and somewhat experimental. On this basis, the top positions were quite naturally filled by the young workers who had been operating the pilot plant. While management was generally following a policy of promotion by seniority, here the seniority principle was set aside.

Furthermore, management took steps to build up the importance of these positions. In pay, the #3 man in Hi-Test earned as much as the top operators of the adjoining regular gasoline plant, while the #2 and #1 men received successively higher pay.

Furthermore, the polymerization (poly) operator, the #1 man, was told that his position was so important that he was supposed to be a "company man." In accordance with his quasi-supervisory status, he was required to attend (on his own time) weekly poly-operator meetings with his foreman. He was told also that he was not eligible for membership in the company union—a management-encouraged employee representation plan.

Hi-Test consisted of three operating units which, to the layman, presented a veritable technological wonderland.

The motive power for the process was generated in the engine room where six huge engines pounded away ceaselessly. They were in the charge of an engine operator, who worked alone with the machines and the noise. Near the engine room was the catalyst plant where an operator with

a crew of about 10 men handled the chemical process that produced the catalyst used in making the gasoline.

The heart of the operation was the control room where the wall was lined with sensitive automatic meters to record every change in the process. Here worked the poly operator, the hydro-stillman, and the fractionator operator.

On its way from gas to iso-octane, the principal component of aviation gasoline, the gas-liquid traveled through hundreds of yards of steel tubing. The tubes carried it through a cracking furnace where it was subjected to a temperature of 1300° fahrenheit. Two cooling towers ran water over the tubes, four fractionating columns separated lighter from heavier parts, several stills distilled the substance, and so on, until it ran off at the end into storage tanks.

The catalyst plant was a chemical manufacturing unit, not connected with the steel tubing which linked the engine room with the control room. The latter two units were directly dependent upon each other in both technical process and human action.

Job Responsibilities and Activities

The work duties of the control room were largely divided between the fractionator operator (#3) and the hydro-stillman (#2). The poly operator (#1) was responsible for control room, catalyst plant and engine room, but there were charts in the control room registering the engine room operations, so little human contact there was necessary. The poly operator hardly ever walked over to the engine room. The engine operator usually came into the control room once a day, to join the others at lunch, and perhaps once more during the working day. There was nothing to take the poly operator into the catalyst plant except his responsibility for checking on work activity; the catalyst operator was hardly ever seen in the control room.

The work of the three control-room men (for each shift) is difficult to describe because, except for regular hourly samples of product for testing to be drawn from various pieces of equipment, the activity depended very largely upon the condition of the process. When operations were going smoothly, the men had little to do but watch their charts; when operations were not going quite right, there were adjustments to make almost constantly. Since any adjustment made by the fractionator operator affected operations in the area of the hydro-stillman (and vice versa), this would be a period of accelerated communication between them and with the poly operator.

An emergency would generate greatly accelerated activity. For example, if one engine broke down, the control-room men had to respond quickly in order to lighten the load on the other five. Otherwise, the other overloaded engines might all go down, and the process would come to a very costly halt.

The poly operator had a large and heavy responsibility but few specifically assigned duties. Every hour he was required to look into the cracking furnace from both sides, to check the condition of the tubes. Grey shadows on the white-hot tubes indicated carbon deposits that might cause a blow-out, pouring vapors into the furnace and setting off a fire that would play over the outside of the furnace. If these carbon deposits could be blown out, the life of the tubes would be prolonged. While the poly operator had certain other checks to make, his job consisted primarily of coordinating the activities of the other two men.

It was *technically* possible to operate the control room with only two men, and, in fact, the plant was set up on this basis. However, the company found it necessary to set up the poly-operator position to assure a proper coordination between the other two men.

Above the poly operator, in the line of authority, were the foreman, plant manager, division superintendent, General Superintendent of Field Operations, Department Manager, Vice President for the Natural Gasoline Department, President, and Chairman of the Board of Directors.

The Masters Crackdown

In 1939, Fred Fitzgerald, General Superintendent of Field Operations, died suddenly. This marked the end of an era for the company. Fitzgerald had started work with the company shortly after its founding. As he worked his way up from the labor gang, he never lost touch with the workers. In earlier years, he had made frequent visits to all the company's plants. He wanted to know each man personally. The men said that old Fred might come in and swear at you, but you could swear right back at him. As the company grew, Fitzgerald's visits became less frequent, but, to the day of his death, the men believed that you could go right up to see Fred in the main office. You could talk there as long as you liked, and old Fred, his feet on the desk, would listen to you. Furthermore, if you had a good case, you could be sure Fred would do something for you.

Roger Masters, the new General Superintendent, was a complete unknown in the Hi-Test area. The men learned about him soon enough.

When Masters took over, conditions in the Hi-Test area were exceedingly lax. There was widespread gambling—joined in even by the plant manager. The men were taking regular gasoline and aviation gasoline for their cars. Notices were posted indicating that this was against the rules, but no disciplinary actions were taken.

Suddenly Masters cracked down. In one fell swoop, he fired the division manager, the plant manager, and a plant superintendent. He also fired seven workers for stealing gasoline. (At the intercession of the company union, four of them were reinstated—in lower ranking jobs).

Masters followed up by calling a meeting of local management and company union representatives. When a foreman raised a question about cooperating with the workers, Masters is reported to have said, "To hell with cooperation. All I want out of those men is eight hours work a day—on their feet!" After this, the boxes the men used to sit on were removed from the control room. By 1943, the boxes were back—but they were used only at lunch time.

Masters' dramatic beginning had a most unsettling effect upon the local scene. Now, for the first time, union organization drives began to make headway. Poly-operator Joe Sloan commented, "Masters changed me from Republican to

Democrat, from anti-union to pro-union—overnight." This from a man who had not taken gasoline nor been directly punished in any way.

The company now opened a new plant, similar to Hi-Test, in another area. Some of the Hi-Test operators transferred to take over the top positions in this new plant. The vacancies thus created were filled on the basis of seniority. Since Hi-Test was now operating smoothly, the company no longer felt it necessary to select operators on the basis of ability alone.

This change created an unusual situation among the Hi-Test men who filled the top three positions on the four regular teams. Where seniority is followed in promotions, the men in higher positions will have longer service to their credit —and, on the average, they will probably be older too. In Hi-Test, in 1943, there was no significant difference in seniority among the top three positions. In age, the poly operators (#1) averaged 32½ years, the hydro-stillman (#2) 35½, and the fractionator operators (#3) almost 45. Poly operators Joe Sloan and Mark Walling, 27 and 31 years old in 1943, were the youngest men in the control room, and both had held the top position from the beginning.

Blocking the Road Up

Shortly after the Masters shake-up, the Vice President of the department promulgated a new policy. In view of the rapid scientific and technical development of the company, he decided that only college graduates should be appointed as foremen.

Up until this time, men had been rising out of the ranks into management positions. The new ruling hit the Hi-Test plant particularly hard, for some of these men had been singled out as especially able and promising. The poly operators were, of course, most upset, for now they were at the top with no place to go. In 1943 it was common to hear some of them say, "We're just bumping our heads against the ceiling here."

At first Joe Sloan refused to believe he was blocked. Enrolling in an International Correspondence School course in chemical engineering, he built a little laboratory in his cellar and spent many long hours at his studies. No one in local management could say whether completion of this stiff course would be accepted as a substitute for a college degree. As he pushed ahead with his course, with his superior grades duly reported by ICS to management, Joe was hopeful. But, as months passed and Joe received no recognition or encouragement from management, he became increasingly pessimistic.

With the ceiling clamped down above them, the poly operators became increasingly concerned over the ambiguous position they seemed to occupy. At first, the unknown difficulties of controlling the process challenged all their interest, knowledge and skill. But now they would say, "It's just a routine." And the more routine it became, the more it could be handled by the hydro-stillman and the fractionator operator, checking with each other, without the intervention of the poly operator.

Responsibility for the catalyst plant weighed heavily with them. They knew little about the manufacturing process in that plant, so they could provide no technical guidance. They could only "go down there and see if everybody is working," as the foreman put it. Naturally this sort of police work was resented in the catalyst plant. The situation came to a head when a catalyst operator and a poly operator got into a fight. The foreman responded by relieving the poly operators of responsibility for the catalyst plant.

About this time, the poly operators heard that in a new plant men holding jobs similar to theirs were receiving higher wages. They chose Joe Sloan as their spokesman in presenting their case for more money to local management. In building up the importance of the position, Joe stressed the poly operators' supervisory responsibilities. Management turned down the request and countered by ending the weekly poly operator meetings and announcing that the poly operators were now eligible for membership in the company union.

Later, when a CIO organizing drive was on, the poly operators made one last attempt. They requested that they be given the title of "shift foreman" so that they would not have to make a choice between CIO and company union. The request was turned down.

In this series of steps, the ambiguous status of the poly operators was clarified—downward. As this went on, the men took an increasing interest in the CIO.

Supervisory Relations

In the years 1938-1942, the Hi-Test operators were in almost constant friction with their foreman. Ed Jones and Tom Fitch, the two men who held the position in those years, seemed so much alike to the men that it is hard to distinguish between them. Both were chemical engineering graduates who took over the supervisory position almost fresh out of college. They were considered aggressive and opinionated.

According to the men, if you tried to make a suggestion regarding operations, they would break in before you had finished to tell you why it would not work. Later you might find the change made—as the foreman's own idea.

They issued detailed instructions as to how the equipment was to be operated and would accept no criticisms of these instructions. The men learned that if operations did not turn out right it could not be because the instructions were wrong; it must be because the men did not follow instructions properly. To get out from under this criticism, the workers took to "boiler-housing" the figures on the Daily Operating Data sheet. When they were given instructions that they felt would not produce the required results, the workers filled in on the data sheet the readings the foreman would think correct. Meanwhile, they simply operated the plant in the way that experience had taught them would be effective.

The foremen were accused of being hyper-critical and of playing favorites at the same time. "There were some men who just couldn't do anything right, and there were others who just couldn't do anything wrong." (In such a complex inter-related process, it is extraordinarily difficult to determine responsibility for mistakes.)

While the weekly poly-operator meetings were still being held, the foremen sought to use them as a forum for discussion of the failings of the other workers. The poly operators

were encouraged to speak up and tell what was wrong with their subordinates.

This put the poly operators in a very difficult position. If one man spoke up, another man was sure to take the word back to the ranks—and, after all, the poly operator had to spend eight hours a day with his hydro-stillman and fractionator operator. On the other hand, if they did not speak up, the foreman considered them uncooperative. When the foreman was "down on" a man, it was hard for that man to maintain the self-confidence he needed for his job. But the foreman's favor was not an unmixed blessing either.

Joe Sloan reported that while Mark Walling was considered to be the best man, the foreman also had confidence in Sloan. Like them, he was young and eager to learn. They recognized that he knew a good deal about the scientific foundations of his job. But of course the other workers knew how the foremen regarded Sloan, so, when a man "got in bad" with the boss, he might suspect that Sloan had "squealed" on him—even though Joe insisted he never talked against his men.

So being a favorite just got you in trouble with your fellow workers. What could the foreman do for you anyway? He couldn't get you a promotion.

This period of conflict, then, was not only along the lines of foremen versus workers. It was a period of buck-passing and back-biting, of intrigue and suspected intrigue that divided worker from worker.

The Narrow Escape

In the spring of 1942, poly-operator Joe Sloan experienced an almost fatal accident. While he was looking into the cracking furnace to inspect the condition of the steel tubes, one of the tubes blew out and burst into flames on the *outside* of the furnace immediately behind him. The flames missed Sloan, so he escaped injury. Had the blow-out occurred a foot or two nearer to him, he might have suffered the most severe burns. If the blow-out had occurred inside the furnace, the gasoline vapors would have poured into the furnace causing a fire that would have burst through the furnace openings and played all around the outside. Standing right next to the furnace, Sloan could easily have been burned to death.

While Sloan escaped injury, this was naturally a severe shock to him. In fact, thereafter Sloan never again looked into the cracking furnace from the north side where the near accident had happened. He continued to carry out his hourly inspections at the south side, although he freely admitted that there was just as much danger on one side of the furnace as on the other.

A New Supervisory Approach

Early in 1942, Jess Douglas and Tom Lloyd came in as plant manager and Hi-Test foreman. The Hi-Test workers attributed these changes to management's alarm at the progress of the new CIO organizing drive. Whatever the reasons for the changes, the new men soon demonstrated that they were pursuing a new management approach. Within a short time, they were both well-liked and respected.

The workers were particularly impressed by the contrast between Lloyd and the two previous foremen. One of them put it this way:

> Tom Lloyd is entirely different from Jones. Ed Jones would come down here and tell us what changes we had to make and that was all. If we could figure out from that what we were making, all right, but he never told us. Tom comes down here and tells us that we have to make a certain product and asks us how we think we ought to go about it. He will say to us, "You fellows know more about this than I do, what do you think?" Of course, he really knows a lot more than we do, but that flatters our egos and we will figure out with him the way we ought to do it.

Tom Lloyd explained his approach in these words, as he was discussing his use of the Daily Operating Data sheets:

> That sheet is not there primarily for my checking. The purpose of it is to enable the men to know what they are doing. By just looking over that sheet, I can tell how things are going. If something is wrong, I just ask the men to explain it to me. I never try to fix responsibility or say who is to blame. If a man's explanation is weak, he knows it as well as I do. I don't have to tell him. In telling me, he tells himself. That is all that is necessary. These men are very sensitive; they have thin skins and they take great pride in their work.

Dan Benton, a staff engineer, came in shortly after Douglas and Lloyd, and he too was well-accepted by the men. As he worked for Lloyd on some of Hi-Test's technical problems, he showed his respect for the knowledge and ability of the workers. On any Hi-Test problem, he sought their advice and always weighed it carefully.

In the course of a year, worker-management relations at Hi-Test improved remarkably, but an underlying problem remained. As Joe Sloan put it, "Jess Douglas and Tom Lloyd are the best fellows you would ever want to work for, but that old company heart is beating up in the main office—not down here."

Suppose we vote down the CIO, the men asked themselves, what then? They could take Douglas and Lloyd out of here tomorrow. Roger Masters is still up in the main office, isn't he?

The Watchman Statement

Masters was indeed still there, and now once again he appeared on the local scene.

The division manager in this area had suggested to the president of the company union that he "demand" an opening of contract negotiations on all issues, including wages. (The existing contract, signed several years earlier, did not cover wages.)

In the first vote for a Hi-Test company union representative, more than half of the men refused to vote at all. The remaining votes had been scattered among Jesus Christ, Joseph Stalin, several obscenities, and two workers.

Foreman Lloyd then called the men together to propose

a second vote. He said he respected their opinion of the company union, but now that these negotiations were to start, Hi-Test would be bound by the new contract. Wasn't it only prudent to have a representative in these sessions? The men could still vote CIO if they wished, when the election came off. In the second vote, more valid ballots were counted and a fractionator operator (#3) was elected.

At first, the negotiations went smoothly, and the workers gained the impression that the management people might be sincere in trying to satisfy worker interests. Even General Superintendent Masters did not seem to be such a bad guy when you really got to know him.

On February 1, after several days of discussion, the company union representatives began arguing the case for higher wages at Hi-Test. Since the work required great skill and considerable scientific knowledge, they claimed, the Hi-Test operators should receive at least as much as refinery workers holding comparable jobs.

All afternoon long, management argued against such an increase. When the formal meeting broke up, Masters stood around with several workers, still discussing Hi-Test. It was then that he made the statement which went down in the history of this division. The Hi-Test representative described the event in this way:

> Did you hear what Masters said about us? He told us that we were only watchmen. He said, "Down there in that plant you have got automatic controls and charts. If anything goes wrong with the meters, you just call a meter man. If anything goes wrong with the engines, you call a repairman. If anything goes wrong with operations, you call an engineer, and he tells you what to do. There is no skill in that work. You just have to watch the charts."

This precipitated a storm of resentment not only at Hi-Test but at all the other installations in the area. The CIO organizers suddenly found that they could sign up men who before had been most drastic in their anti-CIO statements.

On the day following the watchman statement, the Hi-Test operators were having trouble with fractionating column #4. Dan Benton, staff engineer, dropped in to ask the poly operator what seemed to be the trouble. The worker shrugged his shoulders and replied, "You're supposed to tell us." When the chief engineer of the division came in and asked the same question, he got the same answer. This was most embarrassing to the engineers.

A few days later, Dan Benton ran into more serious trouble. When he arrived in the control room this particular morning, he immediately took the fractionator operator aside and instructed him in the changes that were to be made, since Benton's plans on this occasion were concentrated on the fractionation process. As soon as Foreman Tom Lloyd arrived in the plant, the poly operator went to him and expressed strong resentment against Benton. He said, "Who's running this plant—me or Benton?" Lloyd agreed that a mistake had been made and assured the poly operator that in the future all changes in operations would be discussed with him first.

While both Lloyd and Benton recognized that it had been a mistake to by-pass the poly operator, Benton's previous relations with the operators had been so informal that he had frequently made such a direct approach before without stirring any protest. The operators now seemed to be especially sensitive regarding their relations with the engineers.

The men now began talking against the training program management was developing in order to prepare men for the more highly skilled jobs. The men said, in effect, "If we are only watchmen, why should the company want us to learn anything?"

When telephone calls came in to Hi-Test from workers in other local plants, they now asked to talk to "the chief watchmen." And for several days the poly operators signed the Daily Operating Data sheet as "the watchman."

Changes in Hours and Work Teams

By March 1, 1943, the white heat of worker reaction had died down, but now the company introduced a major change in its work schedules.

A butadiene (synthetic rubber) plant was about to go into operation in another area. Management needed experienced operators to take over the top worker positions there. A representative of the butadiene plant arrived in the Hi-Test area early in February to describe the job opportunities before meetings of workers. Then he arranged interviews with any interested worker to explore the possibilities of a transfer.

No one had to go to the butadiene plant, but management announced that in order to spread out the manpower, the work week would be increased from 44 to 48 hours. Management hoped that enough men would elect to transfer so that no local demotions would be necessary.

Since no poly operator transferred out of Hi-Test the lengthening of the work week left the plant with a surplus of one-half of a poly operator. One of the men would have to spend three days of his work week in the #2 position as hydro-stillman. The lengthening of the work week also had the effect of breaking up work teams that had worked together for many months. Now, each week the poly operator would have different subordinates.

To avoid any charges of favoritism, foreman Lloyd and manager Douglas decided to place the man with least seniority in the divided position of poly operator and hydro-stillman. The change thus fell to Joe Sloan. To soften the blow, Douglas talked to Sloan and assured him that he would retain the poly-operator classification and pay for his entire work week. With an additional four hours a week on time-and-a-half overtime pay, Sloan's earnings were substantially increased. He was also assured that this would not affect his chances for advancement upon completing his ICS course.

At this point, Sloan went off on his two weeks vacation. He took this opportunity to look for other jobs. One was offered him in an aircraft factory, and for several days he wavered, but finally decided that the future of that plant was too uncertain to justify a change.

A week after Sloan returned to work, another poly operator went to the hospital for an operation that was expected to keep him out for two months. Sloan expected that now

he would return to working all six days as a poly operator. However, management decided that the job should be opened to bids and filled on a seniority basis. It thus fell to Johnny Hudson who, prior to March 1, had served for many months as Sloan's hydro-stillman. Sloan commented that, while he did not understand the decision, he had nothing against Hudson, who remained a good friend of his.

The Representation Election

The union representation election of April 4 was won by the company union, 106 to 92. The Hi-Test men voted CIO by a substantial margin. The CIO union immediately contested the election, charging the company with unfair labor practices. The charge was upheld and a new election was to be held, but, for the time being, the campaign was over.

Making the Experimental Product

At 6:30 on Tuesday night, April 6, Tom Lloyd received a telephone call from the main office with the order to start the tri-isobutylene run as soon as possible. He had known some time in advance that a product of this nature was to be made, but this was the first time he was given exact specifications (initial boiling point and dry point temperature). Lloyd asked if he could start the run the following morning, but he was told that this was a rush order, so that it was necessary to start work immediately. Since Lloyd was not familiar with the detailed operations of the fractionating column, he telephoned Dan Benton, his staff engineer, and asked him to return to the plant to take charge of operations at once.

The fractionating column in which the product was to be made was under the direct charge of the fractionator operator, but, having had a good deal of fractioning experience, the hydro-stillman was naturally interested also, and both men normally worked under the supervision of the poly operator.

To this group were added Lloyd and Benton who ordinarily spent little time within the plant. During the run, Lloyd spent most of his time at Hi-Test, consulting with Benton and the operators. He also took samples from the fractionating column up to the laboratory in order to run distillations tests on them. When he went home to sleep, he called in catalyst-operator Thompson to do the distillations.

Benton was in active charge from Tuesday night until Friday morning. During that period, he was in the plant almost continually, getting only 10 hours sleep. At the start, he took over the #3 fractionating column himself and directed the fractionator operator in all changes. Since otherwise the plant was operating in a routine manner, there was little for the poly operator and hydro-stillman to do except watch Benton and the fractionator operator.

Benton had certain definite ideas as to how the run should be started, and it appeared that by Tuesday morning he had been successful. The product at that time tested to specifications, but by the time the test results were reported the column had become flooded and was no longer making the product. Having been unsuccessful in this effort, Benton listened to the suggestions of the operators and tried out a number of their ideas.

At the start of the daylight tour (7 a.m. to 3 p.m., Friday), fractionator-operator Kendall gave his opinion to Lloyd that no further progress could be gained along the lines then being pursued, and went on to outline his ideas as to how the fractionating column should be handled. Lloyd had a high regard for Kendall and therefore determined to turn the column over to him without restrictions or supervision. By now Benton was physically and nervously exhausted and Lloyd sent him home.

At the end of Kendall's tour he still had no results, but he was able to convince Lloyd that he was moving in the right direction. Lloyd ordered Kendall to work another eight hours, remaining in charge of the key column. Walling was poly operator on evening tour (3 to 11 p.m.). Lloyd instructed Walling to pay close attention to the way Kendall was operating the column.

At the end of evening tour, the product was still to be made. Lloyd sent Kendall home and held Walling over for another eight hours, ordering him to take exclusive charge of the column. Early Saturday morning, 22 hours after Kendall began trying his plan, the product came over, and shortly thereafter the brief run was completed.

One operator expressed the general viewpoint of the workers when he said:

> It wasn't until they left it to the operator that they got the thing lined out. Sure, it would have gone much faster if they had made it that way in the first place. The operator knows these columns better than the technical man.

During the week of the run, Sloan had worked Monday through Wednesday on graveyard tour (11 p.m. to 7 a.m.) as a hydro-stillman under Walling. Thursday through Saturday, he worked as poly operator, but, when the product was finally being made, he found Walling held over to retain charge of the key column.

Later, although he said that the tri-isobutylene run had not bothered him much, Sloan made these comments:

> Now I don't have anything against Benton. I like Dan. But we hadn't been accustomed to having an engineer supervise operations like that. He was around all the time telling the fractionator man what to do. Lloyd was there most of the time too. He didn't really do anything. He would just talk to Benton and with the rest of us, figuring out what to do. Then he spent some of his time running distillations . . .
>
> One night when I was on tour, we had Thompson in there from the catalyst plant running distillations for Lloyd while he slept. We had never had a man from the catalyst plant work in there with us before. Thompson (a company union representative) and I got into a hot argument about the company union and the CIO. It didn't really amount to anything, but I didn't like to have Thompson around all the time. He has the type of overbearing personality that don't appeal to me . . .
>
> One night Ed Smith (Lloyd's predecessor as foreman) called the plant at 2 a.m. He had something to do with

the run from the main office . . . Smith knows the operations here a lot better than Lloyd . . . Lloyd was in the plant with us at the time. I asked him why he thought Smith had called. "Oh," he says, "he probably just wanted to show he was interested in his job." I said to Lloyd, "Then why are you down here now? For the same reason?" He didn't have anything to say to that.

The Walk-off of Joe Sloan

Sunday, following the tri-isobutylene run, was Sloan's day off. He returned to work Monday morning as hydro-stillman for Johnny Hudson. This was the first time Sloan had worked under his former hydro-stillman.

In the middle of the morning shift, the men encountered a safety hazard, About once a month, the operators had to run an order of iso-heptene; when that run was completed, they shifted back to the regular product, iso-octane. To make the shift, they had to empty the pipes of iso-heptene, venting the vapors and liquids onto the control room floor. For a few minutes, until the liquid had evaporated, it spread over the floor and fumes filled the air.

In the midst of this change-over process, Joe Sloan suddenly walked off the job and went home.

Johnny Hudson described his leaving in this way:

> It was really a hazard, but I didn't know what Joe was going to do until he just tapped me on the back and says, "Johnny, I am leaving you with it." I was sure sorry to see him go.

The foreman, Tom Lloyd, gave this account:

> I was down at the Catalyst Plant when Sloan called me. He says, "Come on up here. I have something I want to show you." When I got there, he was purple in the face and he shook his finger under my nose. He says, "I have told you about this time and time again. I have told you to do something about this, and you have done nothing. A man ought not to have to work in conditions like this."
>
> Now he was in the right about it. We should have connected those lines up outside so that the place wouldn't have been flooded. We have done that now. It was just one of those things I hadn't got around to although I had always meant to do it. But that thing had happened 50 times before, and the men had just taken it, so when Sloan made such a fuss about it, I couldn't help thinking it was funny.
>
> I must have smiled, but I tried to keep a straight face. I says to him, "Now you get off me." After that he calmed down a little but he said, "I don't think a man ought to have to work under such conditions." I says, "That's right. He don't have to." Sloan walks around the pump a couple of times and then he comes back to me and says, "I don't think I will work under such conditions."
>
> Then he taps Johnny Hudson on the shoulder and says the same thing to him. After that he goes up and talks to Jess (Jess Douglas, Plant Manager). From what Jess said to me, I don't think Sloan had anything against me personally. He just said, "I got fed up and decided to leave."

The walk-off ended Joe Sloan's career with the company. As Joe described it several weeks later:

> I didn't really resign, if that's what you want to know. I got out under pressure. When I came up to talk to Douglas on my way home, I didn't think I was quitting, but when we were about half way home, he told me he didn't think I ought to come back. When he and Franklin talked with me at home yesterday, Douglas said, "If I were you, I wouldn't have the face to come back in the plant after leaving in the face of hazard." I says, "Do you mean that you wouldn't do anything about that." And he says, "I wouldn't have the face to go back in the plant after that." I told him I had called it to the attention of Tom several times, and he had done nothing about it. This time there was gasoline on the floor and gas vapors in the air. The windows were open and the wind was blowing from the north toward the furnace. I said to him, "It looks like a man has to quit or get roasted like a pig to get any action don't it?" And he says, "I wouldn't say that." But right after I left they did fix up that connection outside the control room.

Sloan received two weeks sick pay and a recommendation for his new job.

The Sloan case aroused much comment among the workers. Ed Logan, a hydro-stillman and one of the most popular men in the plant, said:

> It's too bad, Joe has always been a little hot-headed, but I've never known him to do a man an injustice. Now there are some men in here that are already talking against him. It is that selfishness that you see all over here. Now I stand to gain more out of this than anybody else. But I would be tickled to death to see him come back. I talked with him for an hour and a half at his home last night about it.

Frank Swanson, a fractionator operator who had worked under Sloan for many months, had this to say:

> He was a smart boy, but there must have been a cog loose somewhere. A man shouldn't fly off the handle like that.

Mark Walling, a poly operator on another tour (shift), made this comment:

> Sloan will be hard to replace. This place is losing a damn good operator . . . They just say the man blowed up. But why does a man blow up like that? They ought to try to find that out.

To the men of Hi-Test plant, that was a real puzzle. While some of them had their theories, no one was able to explain it even to his own satisfaction—not Plant Manager Douglas, not Foreman Lloyd, not fellow workers, and even Joe Sloan himself could not go much beyond describing the emotions he experienced and the actions he took in the crisis.

Analysis

In this case we are studying an organization and also an individual: poly-operator Joe Sloan. As we examine organi-

zational changes, we are better able to understand the behavior of the individual. As we examine individual behavior, we are better able to understand the significance of organizational changes:

Let us first analyze these organizational changes:

Changes of Organization Structure

When an organization grows, its structure necessarily changes, and new human relations problems arise. In the period up to 1939, old Fred Fitzgerald, who had risen with the growth of the company to the position of General Superintendent, represented a connecting link between workers and top management. As the industrial hierarchy lengthened, the workers still felt that Fitzgerald was there to take care of any serious problems. But towards the end of Fitzgerald's life, the organization had grown so much that his visits to the various plants were becoming steadily less frequent.

When Roger Masters took Fitzgerald's place, the link between bottom and top of the organization was destroyed. Perhaps no new man in such a large organization could have maintained such a link. As it was, Masters' first moves made it abundantly clear to the workers that basic changes had taken place in the organization. His sweeping changes in management personnel, his crack-down on gasoline stealing, his statement regarding worker cooperation—all these actions indicated to workers that they could no longer hope to take their problems up with higher management on an individual basis. They suggested that the workers had better get a union organization to speak for them as a body.

We should recognize that certain laxities had developed in the area of the Hi-Test operations, so that some changes were to be expected. This was acknowledged by the workers themselves. However, it was the suddenness and drastic nature of the changes, imposed without any prior discussion, that had such a far-reaching effect upon the organization. The administrator needs to learn that he has not solved the problem of action when he has determined that certain changes must be introduced. He must still consider what steps should be taken so as to minimize disturbance and assure constructive results.

Technical Knowledge and Operating Skill

A good part of this case describes an overt and covert argument between workers and management regarding the amount of knowledge and skill required for worker and also for supervisory positions. We can see the issue most sharply drawn in management's decision that only college graduates should hold management positions.

The effects of this decision on worker-management relations were marked and pervasive. There was worker resentment throughout the area operations, but particularly in Hi-Test where young and ambitious men had risen rapidly and were now bumping their heads against the ceiling. Some top management people found it difficult to understand why the men in this area, who were receiving the highest pay, were also the most interested in joining a CIO union. If we think in terms of social mobility and career expectations, there should be no mystery about it.

Management's decision on the college education also served to draw a sharp class line between workers and managers. This line was accentuated by the behavior of the first two college-trained Hi-Test foremen. But it remained there under the surface even when Tom Lloyd took over as foreman.

This type of management thinking tends to spill over beyond the consideration of qualifications for management positions and to affect management's view of the knowledge and skills required of workers. There is a tendency to build up the knowledge that is assumed to be possessed by management and to devalue the knowledge and skill possessed by the workers. Carried to its extreme point, this point of view would hold that all the essential knowledge for operating a plant is possessed by management, whereas workers are only hands who are hired to carry out management's directions. It was, in fact, precisely this point of view that Roger Masters expressed in his "watchman" statement. We should consider the watchman statement from two points of view. In terms of its effects upon human relations, it is obvious that any such statement by a manager, reflecting in this manner upon the skill and knowledge of workers, is bound to have most serious repercussions. From this standpoint, even if the statement were true it would have been most unwise to make it.

Furthermore, was the statement an accurate representation of the situation at Hi-Test? Perhaps the best answer is contained in the comment by foreman Tom Lloyd, himself a college graduate in chemical engineering. He said:

> Masters told the truth, but that was only part of the story. He said that the men were only watchmen, that they just had to watch the charts and call in specialists for anything they needed done. It is true they have all these indicators, but they have to do more than just watch. A man has to know that if he sees one thing on a chart over here, he has to look at another chart to see how that fits in. He uses those charts to diagnose the situation. He acts like a doctor. The doctor doesn't only read your temperature and check your pulse. He uses those things to tell him what needs to be done. A man in operations needs experience to do that. The engineers can't do it for him.

The experience of the tri-isobutylene run demonstrated the soundness of Lloyd's statement—even though at the time he failed to apply it to his problem.

In college, the engineer is not taught how to operate fractionating column #4 at the Hi-Test Plant. He learns the basic principles of chemical engineering that will enable him to understand the fractionation process and perhaps to make basic improvements in the process. But somehow a complex piece of equipment never acts just exactly as theory dictates. The skillful operator, through long hours of experience on his job, learns things about it that no engineer with a much broader range of duties can ever possibly grasp. Even in much simpler jobs, we have found this to be the case. Therefore, the problem of efficiency as well as the problem of cooperation depends upon an effective combination of technical knowledge and worker-operating skills.

In such a situation, some workers will learn what adjustments to make without understanding why. There will be at

least a few others, like Joe Sloan, who developed both the "feel" of the job and some of its scientific foundations. Even in the growing complexities of modern technical processes, these men seem qualified to move up into management. In fact, there are other companies in the same industry, with the same processes, who have not had a flat policy against selecting foremen out of the ranks. In one company, for example, while the management people are largely college trained, there has been a practice of teaming the college and non-college man together out in the fields and plants. In one place, the superintendent will be a college graduate and his assistant a man up from the ranks; in another installation, it will be the other way around. In this way, the necessity for combining job knowledge with technical knowledge and with a variety of social experience has been recognized. In fact, in the same company here described, the policy of selecting only college-trained men as foremen was changed shortly after the end of our story. As the company continued to expand rapidly in the war-time boom, there simply were not enough college trained engineers available for the new supervisory positions.

Foreman-Worker Relations

The factors giving rise to foreman-worker conflicts under Jones and Smith are too obvious to require comment. It will be more instructive to look at the experience of Tom Lloyd. He got along exceedingly well with the men, and yet he was not able to solve some of the basic problems of worker-management relations. Why not?

In the first place, we note the limitations of the foreman's position. Even as the workers expressed their respect for Tom Lloyd, they spoke in quite different terms about Roger Masters and other top management officials who could introduce sudden changes at any time. Nor was Tom Lloyd able to do anything about the policy regarding promotion of non-college men, even though he believed that several of his Hi-Test operators were well-qualified for supervisory positions.

In the second place, the tri-isobutylene run demonstrates for us the way in which a change in technology or process can upset worker-management relations, even when the foreman continues to be regarded as a good supervisor. This run brought about a sudden and drastic change in the relations among the operators and between operators and management. Dan Benton, the staff engineer, in effect took over operations, leaving the poly operator little to do. Benton and Lloyd enormously increased the time they spent with the operators in the plant. Thompson, a lower-status man from the catalyst plant — a previous source of friction — came in to run tests which, in effect, told the Hi-Test men how they were progressing. Finally, when the job was left to operators, first a fractionator operator and then a poly operator was held over for an additional eight hours to take control of operations from the men regularly assigned.

The run yielded poor results both in technical efficiency and in human relations. In fact, it demonstrates the mutual dependence of efficiency and human relations.

How should such a run have been handled? The operators believed that if it had been left to them, they would have been able to produce the product in a much shorter time. In discussions afterward, Tom Lloyd, while admitting the failure of his approach in the case, was not sure that the operators were right. He argued that, in the best of circumstances, it would take more than eight hours to produce the new product. Thus, if different poly operators had different theories about how to reach this goal, by just leaving it to them it would be impossible to attain the necessary consistency that efficient progress required. Perhaps that is true, but conversations held with the operators before the run suggest that there may have been more consistency in their approach than the foreman recognized. Several of these men, as they contrasted their own operating approach to that of the engineers, said that the engineer tends to shoot straight at the target, as his theories locate that target for him. On the other hand, the operator, with his more intimate familiarity with the equipment, is inclined to make a little change and *wait* to see what effect it has. Then he makes another small change and waits again and so on. He is content with a gradual approach to the target. It is interesting to note that in the tri-isobutylene run the engineer's performance fitted in with the previous statements of the operators. He aimed for the target, he got there too fast, he overshot the mark, and the whole job had to be done over.

However, even if we accept Lloyd's statement regarding the need for a uniform approach, it does not necessarily follow that the engineer must take over in order to provide the approach. If Lloyd and Benton had had time before starting the run to consult some of the operators, this could have led to a decision regarding a uniform approach, which would then have been carried out under the direction of the poly operators. Perhaps Lloyd and Benton would have approached the problem in this way, had they been given time. If so, top management's demands for immediate action simply prolonged the process.

Why Did Joe Walk Off?

Let us now turn to Joe Sloan. It is easy to see why he was dissatisfied even while he held the top operating position. Not only had he risen rapidly to the top and then been blocked from further advancement; he also found, as the years went by and the process became more routinized, that the work held less interest for him and was accorded less importance on the part of management. His position in between workers and management was so defined that the status of his job was lowered and he was identified as a worker.

Beginning in March 1943, the changes came more rapidly for him. As the men went from 44 to 48 hours, Sloan's pay check was substantially increased and he retained his poly-operator classification. However, he suffered a loss in status and a marked change in his relations with management and the men as he began spending three days a week in the #2 operating position.

Perhaps it was wise for management to make this demotion on a seniority basis, but the failure to restore Sloan to his full-time top position when another poly operator was out, seems much more questionable. Management was bound by no seniority clause in a union contract. Furthermore, even union contracts have considerable variety of provisions covering how seniority is to be interpreted. In many cases, the

man who, like Sloan, has already established the higher position but has been demoted in a cutback, is entitled to reestablish his position ahead of men who may have greater seniority. Furthermore, management followed the seniority rule here in an effort to satisfy the men. Actually, the decision was not popular among the men. Even though Sloan was not universally popular among them, there was a general feeling that he had far more ability than Johnny Hudson. Had he been restored to his position without any bids on the job, it seems likely that there would have been no complaint at all.

For a man in Sloan's position, the tri-isobutylene run would be a particularly trying experience. He had always felt that he knew more about operations than any other man, and had been hoping for a chance to demonstrate his abilities. Here now was the opportunity, and yet he was prevented from grasping it. During the first part of the week he was not in a position to take any initiative, and when finally he did come in as poly operator, his chief rival, Mark Walling, was held over to control the process.

Against this background, the crisis of April 12 becomes more understandable. This was not a case of making something out of nothing—the fire hazard was a real one. But why did Sloan take such drastic action?

His near-fatal accident a year earlier may help to explain why Sloan was more sensitive than other men to this condition. On the other hand, the same condition had occurred at about monthly intervals in between. Why was it that Sloan didn't blow up until this particular occasion? To answer that question, we have to recognize the changes that had taken place in Sloan's position in the intervening months, and particularly in the weeks preceding April 12. He had been affected more than anyone else by these changes, and they seemed to be piling up on him at an increasingly rapid rate. Now, at last, he served under his former hydro-stillman for the first time. While he insisted he bore no personal resentment against Hudson, this reversal of customary positions could not have been easy to take. And, finally, when he blew up at Tom Lloyd, the foreman was so taken aback at an emotional expression that was out of proportion with the immediate situation, that he was unable to respond effectively. Thus, the man who had taken a leading part in the development of an important new process with the company came to the end of his career, in a manner that left all of the men in Hi-Test, workers and management, uneasy as to what had taken place.

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Button-Down Collar Culture

A Study of Undergraduate Life at a Men's College

*James S. Davie and A. Paul Hare**

Every group existing through time comes to develop its own way of life or culture. Its members tend to do the same things in similar ways and to think similarly about what they and others do. The term culture patterns refers to such consensus of opinion and behavior. Because of such consensus, the individual not only comes to know how to behave in different situations and how to expect others to behave in those situations, but also is afforded a standard against which to measure his own behavior. If his behavior is in accordance with the behavior of others, he is secure in his status as a group member and the group solidarity is correspondingly strengthened, since, in this instance, the group is not faced with the problem of deviancy which must be resolved somehow so as not to disrupt its normal life. In short, a system of rewards and punishments is built into the way of life of the group. The culture functions as a "rule book" which defines the situation for the individual in terms of how he is expected to behave. Those who conform to group norms are rewarded. Those who do not are punished. The norms of the group are not absolute, in the sense that each individual must do exactly the same thing in exactly the same way in the same situation. Rather, they include a certain range of permissible variation. As the individual begins to deviate too sharply, he is regarded as "different." Those whose behavior and/or ideas deviate even more from accepted group practices and beliefs are regarded as "quite different," perhaps labeled as "queer" or "odd" and are regarded as being definitely detrimental to group welfare.

When one looks at the undergraduate body of a university from the general viewpoint sketched above, one begins to understand better the whys and wherefores of student behavior. The undergraduate body as a group may be observed to exhibit certain cultural patterns in every major area of its life. The present paper is concerned in general with undergraduate life at Ivy, a contemporary American college for men, and in specific with the areas of recreation and of intellectual activity as parts of the total way of undergraduate life at Ivy. It presents a shorthand description of some of the more salient aspects of Ivy culture to which the student must effect some sort of adjustment.

Method

The data on which the description is based were collected in a series of group and individual interviews with a stratified sample of eight upperclassmen, following a procedure which has been described in detail in a previous publication.[1] The group to be interviewed was chosen to be representative of the student body with respect to five variables: type of secondary school attended, home state (by section of the country), financial status (scholarship, etc.), area of major subject (humanities, social science, natural science, engineering), and academic record (high, middle, low). Each member of the group was thus regarded as representative of several types of students and as an informant about these types as well as about himself. The sample was limited to juniors and seniors on the assumption that they were more familiar with campus customs. Two group interviews of two hours duration and one individual interview were held on each of the areas reported in this paper. In additional interviews the panel members described other aspects of campus life. The discussion in each interview in each area centered around such questions as: What do most students do? Are there any groups on campus whose behavior is markedly different from that of the majority? How do most students treat the student who does not do what they do? What changes occur in students during their undergraduate years? To what can one attribute these changes? In brief, the discussion attempted to delineate in a tentative way the dominant culture patterns of the campus, the presence or absence of distinct sub-cultures, the reward-punishment system of the group, and the part

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1. A. P. Hare and J. S. Davie, "The Group Interview: Its Use in the Study of Undergraduate Culture," *Sociol. Soc. Res.*, 1954, 39, 81-87. Two studies using other methods which treat the seminar system and extra-curricular activities at the same college are: F. F. Stephan and E. G. Mishler, "The Distribution of Participation in Small Groups: An Exponential Approximation," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1952, 17, 598-608; A. P. Hare, "An Evaluation of Extra-curriculum Activities," *School Rev.*, 1955, 63, 164-168.

played by the culture in changing student behavior during the college years.

After each group meeting a transcript was prepared from stenographic notes and tape recordings, and a copy was given to each group member at the next meeting to be checked for accuracy. Wherever possible, hypotheses suggested by the data were checked by means of participant observation by the investigators and by reference to external sources such as student theses, chaplain's records, the campus police blotter, dean's reports, dormitory office files, and other official college records. The group members also wrote a brief description of their particular friendship groups on campus following a standardized outline which was adapted from Hartshorne.[2]

The findings reported here are necessarily tentative. They are to be seen more as hypotheses than as tested conclusions. From the outset, the study has been seen as a pilot study—one which has been exploratory in nature. All findings and impressions should be subjected to systematic empirical testing, even though the panel evinced a considerable amount of internal consistency with respect to their judgment of the role of culture in the development of other students and their reports on the part it has played in their own experience. In brief, the authors feel that the data gathered from the panel have a high degree of validity but that this feeling does not in any way reduce the desirability of widening the basis of study and of documenting empirically the conclusions which have been drawn.

Patterns of Recreational Activity

Any discussion of culture can include the description of two aspects of culture: the material culture, the things that are used, and the non-material culture, the ways of doing things and thinking about things—ways that are learned by each succeeding generation. At Ivy much of the material culture may be summarized under the heading of "Residential College" — particularly a small, upperclass, men's college. The general theme of the non-material aspects of undergraduate Ivy culture is that the patterns converge to produce and endorse the "well-rounded" man.

The undergraduate recreational patterns were found to cluster around different points in time. They can be conveniently identified by season of the year, since differences exist between the seasons with respect to the type of athletic contests played. Within any season the patterns may be divided into mid-week activity which is predominantly male and weekend activity which is predominantly coed. There is also a cluster of patterns around such special events as the rushing period when the sophomores receive bids to the Ivy fraternities and the spring fraternity weekend. For some undergraduates there is evidence that recreational activities during vacation time are also patterned as a result of being "an Ivy man." Spring vacation in Bermuda, the summer jaunt through Europe, and attendance at debutante balls at Christmas time are appropriate examples of this. Perhaps the greatest division of recreational activities on the Ivy campus occurs between the first two and the last two college years. The prime factors creating such a division are the presence of a fraternity system to which almost all upperclassmen belong, and the absence of university dining halls for upperclassmen.

A Football Weekend. The typical football weekend is an example of the difference in pattern brought about by fraternity membership. Because the undergraduates are not allowed to have cars, the weekend's activities take place on campus; and because there are no coeds nor women's colleges close by, the majority of the women are imported. A few local girls are available, but these are generally relegated to weekday dates for the relatively small group of men who have them. The underclassman's date arrives Friday afternoon by train and is taken to a rooming house in town where she will spend the weekend. Both the room and the usual taxi cost money. After the date has checked in, the couple goes to a dorm cocktail party given by a group of friends. The party ends at seven or shortly after because of the formal College rule that there is to be no "sex-after-seven" in the dorms. The couple then goes over to Center Street to eat, choosing from a limited number of eating places. Men do not generally take their dates to the College dining halls unless as a "lark" or if the date is a "dud." Dining halls are not viewed as an acceptable place because they are not glamorous enough—too rowdy and the food not good enough. After dinner the couple may go to a dance in the gym, go to the movies, drink beer at the local taverns, or, occasionally, go by bus or train into a nearby city. The dances in the gym have low status and few attend regularly. If a man does not have a date, his activities center about his dormitory room or he may try "bird-dogging," that is, trying to pick up the date of some other undergraduate who has had too many drinks to mind. The underclassmen generaly limit themselves to one to three dates during the football season because of the high cost and because there is little to do. The panel estimates that it costs almost twice as much for an underclassman to bring a date to college for a weekend as it does an upperclassman. The dates are generally girls known from pre-college days.

By contrast, the upperclassman's weekend follows a more definite pattern centered about his fraternity. His date arrives by train or car on Friday and is taken to the fraternity where she will stay. From four to seven-thirty they attend a cocktail party at the fraternity, the drinks and the hors d'oeuvres are "free," having already been paid for under a party assessment. Men who drank little before coming to college may drink on this occasion because they have to pay for it anyway. The dinner hour is postponed until 7:30 to accommodate dates who arrive on late trains. The couple eats at the fraternity where there is only one extra charge for the date, since the man's dinner has already been paid for in his membership dues. Friday night the fraternity has a party or openhouse. Saturday after the game there is another party in the fraternity and the evening is spent "fraternity hopping," i.e. moving up and down fraternity row, drink in hand, to visit or dance in other fraternities. The fraternities are open to all fraternity men, grads, and visitors, but if an

2. E. Y. Hartshorne, "Undergraduate Society and College Culture," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1943, 8, 321-322.

underclassman is seen on the street he may be blackballed and never allowed to join a fraternity.

Rate of Change from Freshman to Senior Year. The changes in pattern between underclass and upperclass years indicated above occur rather abruptly when the sophomores join the fraternities in the latter part of their sophomore year. Other definite turning points during the four years of college can also be identified. The individual's recreational behavior changes rapidly when he first arrives on campus in his efforts to conform to the college way of life. The pattern then remains about the same until the rushing period in the second half of the sophomore year. With the beginning of junior year, men eat in the fraternities, migrate to dormitories closer to fraternity row, and take on the upperclass pattern which continues for the last two years, with the exception of a noticeable drop in activity during their senior year while the senior thesis is being prepared.

Mid-week Recreational Patterns. For most undergraduates the mid-week recreation is more important than that of the weekend, particularly the intra-mural athletics for upperclassmen. As a result of the fact that Ivy is a male residential college with abundant athletic facilities and fraternities and is located in a small isolated town, mid-week recreation for the majority is confined to four major areas within a few hundred yards of each other. Each day the undergraduate makes the rounds of fraternity, playing field or gym, Center Street, and his room. The activities other than intra-murals which round out the pattern include bull sessions, fraternity life, card playing, social drinking at the taverns, movies, music, and reading newspapers and magazines.

On a typical week day the undergraduate goes to classes in the morning or, if he has no classes, catches up on his sleep. Engineers or men in the sciences may have labs in the afternoon until four, while AB's (liberal arts majors) are free to participate in extracurricular activities or play cards. From four to six the men go out for intra-mural or team sports. After dinner there is time for a few hands of cards at the fraternity or an early show if one is a member of the "flick team." The movies are out at 11:00 p.m. and the taverns close at 12:00. By midnight the men are returning to their rooms. Bull sessions, which play an important part in dormitory life, may begin at any time and continue until the early hours of the morning.

Sub-cultures in the Area of Recreation. The panel feels that the student body is essentially homogeneous with respect to its recreational patterns with no sharp line of differentiation into sub-cultures. Several groups can be identified, however, based on distinctions of degree rather than of kind. These groups can be arranged on a continuum according to the extent to which they follow the pattern of the majority. Using the majority who follow the pattern as a base point, men who exaggerate the pattern are identified as "goof-offs." At the other extreme are men who consciously do not follow the pattern and who are aware that they are a group apart; these are the "individualists." Between the majority and the individualists, are three groups who also deviate from the pattern, but to a small degree. The most acceptable group is that of the "jocks" (athletes) who are asked by their coaches not to smoke or drink during training and to get to bed early. Next in order of acceptability of motive would be the men whose interest in extracurricular activities or work for student employment prohibit full participation in the pattern of recreation. Press Club men, for example, find it difficult to have a date down for a weekend and still cover their assignments; men who work nights cannot go to the movies. Finally, the "grinds" have the least acceptable motive for not participating. They consciously choose to study rather than to go along with the gang and thereby operate against the norms of study by "wrecking the curve" by their excessive "eagerness." There is probably a considerable degree of overlapping between the population of "grinds" and that of "individualists."

Since the theme of "well-roundedness" supports a recreational pattern which includes a variety of activities, any group who emphasizes one activity or interest must necessarily deviate from the pattern. The dates coming to Ivy from the women's colleges must also be "well-rounded" if they are to participate in all the activities of the weekend. The pattern was seen as functional for upperclass social life in the larger society since the well-rounded man is at an advantage among the country club set. It is also viewed as functional for the future success in business where golf, bridge, etc. are some of the unofficial prerequisites for successful execution of the executive function.

Recreation and Student Development. Defining development sociologically as a change in behavior and/or ideas or values, one may examine the area of recreation from the viewpoint of what changes occur in students during the undergraduate years. Each individual on entering college may be seen as possessing a repertoire of recreational habits and interests which have been shaped by his previous experience. On exposure to undergraduate life, these may change in different ways. Some new behavior may be added, such as learning how to play squash or bridge. Some old behavior may drop out, such as playing on the football team. Former behavior may also be modified in other ways. Sometimes old practices and interests are continued but on a decreased level of frequency and intensity, such as the man who played on his secondary school tennis team but plays tennis only informally and infrequently at college. Sometimes they are maintained on approximately the same level, such as the man who was on his secondary school hockey team and is now on the college hockey team. Sometimes they are accentuated sharply, such as the man who has played little or no bridge and becomes "addicted" to it at college or the man who in secondary school days drank very little but in college drinks considerably (comparatively speaking). In discussing changes in recreational patterns with the panel, one reaches the conclusion that, all in all, there is little new behavior added. What changes do occur seem to be changes in degree rather than in kind. Perhaps the major new aspect is the time element in recreation, where the student is freer than formerly to indulge in recreational activity at hitherto unusual times. Weekday recreation seems important in this respect. Also of seeming importance is the change in the way in which week-

end dating is executed. Girls are imported, which often involves considerable planning, or there are excursions from one community to another for the purpose of dating.

Of those things which are dropped at Ivy, lengthy recreational reading (particularly of novels because of pressure of assignments), the use of cars for dating, and participation in family activities seem to stand out most. Also, there is some evidence that recreation is now confined more exclusively to the peer group, recreational participation with younger and older people having been dropped. Parties and bull sessions appear to be the items that have been increased the most. Considerable mention is made of the more intimate contact the student now has with his peers, of which the bull session is the primary example.

Those items which have been maintained at about the same level seem to run the gamut of possibilities. At first glance, there is an apparent lack of uniformity among individual students with respect to their recreational characteristics and the changes that occur in such characteristics between entrance and graduation. At second glance, however, most individuals seem to be changing in the same general direction of an increasing conformity to the practices and beliefs of Ivy culture. This does not mean that any individual coming to Ivy must learn how to play, say, squash or billiards. The cultural norm is not that specific in dictating details. What the norm does prescribe is that the individual be "well-rounded," which means he must have a well-balanced repertoire of skills and interests which may or may not include any one specific item such as squash. The individual is judged by his versatility of behavior and interests rather than by his proficiency along one line. As one student has put the whole matter, "You can't be just a junior Phi Bete and nothing else to be a good guy. You should participate in sports, be in one extracurricular activity or more, be able to get along easily with others, drink, etc." In brief, the apparent effect of Ivy culture on the individual student's development in the area of recreation is to enlarge his repertoire of skills, increase his interests, and define the importance of recreation in relation to other areas of undergraduate life.

Patterns of Intellectual Activity

Lecture and Class Attendance. During the course of the average week the intellectual activity of the student is centered around study and attendance at classes, seminars, and occasional outside lectures and concerts. Most members of the panel report they attend lectures and concerts if they are interested in the particular lecture subject or musical selections. Because patterns in class attendance could be identified from official records, little time was spent with the panel on this subject. It was felt that it would be more profitable to discuss study habits and related topics about which information can seldom be gathered from official College sources. However, from the data available, it is quite apparent that the average student does not attend all his scheduled classes and seminars. The reasons most mentioned for this are: the pressure of outside activities, such as the student newspaper or annual variety show or the fraternity rushing period, which absorb considerable portions of the students' time; the pressure of assignments in some courses which necessitates cutting other courses to complete them; pressure of meeting deadlines for long-term projects, such as junior papers and senior theses, which necessitates neglect of other courses; leaving early and/or returning late from vacations and/or weekends; and occasionally oversleeping from staying up too late the night before.

Study Habits. With respect to study habits, the panel identified in very broad outlines two types of students: those who study regularly and manage to keep up with all their assignments, and those who leave their assignments until the last minute. In personal interviews half the panel reported they tended to let things slide, and half that they kept up with their assignments fairly well. The panel felt that, as a general principle, study-habits were to be accounted for on an individual basis and that men with similar study-habits did not necessarily or consistently have any other characteristics in common beyond the similarity with which they handled their assignments. However, from remarks made by the panel in group discussions and personal interviews we may infer the presence of certain factors and conditions which operate to produce differences in study habits.

A. *Attitude Toward Intellectual Activities.* First, the student's attitude toward intellectual activities influences his study habits. When the panel members were asked to describe the purpose of a college education, no member limited the purpose solely to acquiring either general knowledge or vocational skills. All of the members were "sold on" the liberal arts approach but gave different reasons for liking it. Men who are going to graduate school want a broad training because they will specialize later, while men who are not going on want the same training to help them in their associations after graduation. They expect to live a fuller life as a result of their college experience, and to them the "full life" is defined as that of the well-rounded man.

When asked whether they thought an interest in and appreciation of scholarly and intellectual activities would be of any value for their post-college occupational success, the majority agreed that such an interest would be very important for future success. However, each of the men also mentioned something else that he felt was *more* important, such as living and working with people, getting to know more people, learning things in extracurricular activities, becoming more tolerant, making new friendships, and being independent.

When asked to describe a scholar and then an intellectual, the panel indicated clearly the value they attached to intellectual activities. The panel felt that scholar was a term applied to men older than themselves who devoted their lives to the pursuit of knowledge, usually in some highly specialized field. While they saw the term "scholar" as a vocational label, they saw the term "intellectual" as describing a psychic quality, a way of looking at life in general. It could be applied to anyone, regardless of age. In the words of the panel, the intellectual was variously described as "a creep," "a skinny little guy with glasses," and "a mental snob." When asked which they would like to have for a friend, the panel showed a general preference for the scholar over the intellectual, but had considerable reservations about each. The usual answer took the form of "it depends on . . ." various other qualities the scholar possessed such as "being a

gentleman" (very likely this stems from the phrase "gentleman and scholar"—a phrase suggesting definite personality characteristics); "not lording it over you;" "more all-round person;" "one of the boys;" "not just with a book all the time," etc. In brief, those who thought they would like the scholar for a friend tended to attribute these extra qualities to the scholar, and those who expressed reservations did so in terms of whether or not the scholar had these qualities. If he did, then they felt they would be likely to want him as a friend.

Whether or not they would like the intellectual as a friend depended again on what other qualities or attributes the intellectual possessed beyond his intellectuality. The panel identified two kinds of intellectuals: those who were just intellectual and those who were intellectual and well-rounded. When speaking of their own generation, they expressed the feeling that a "good guy can be an intellectual but if he's just an intellectual he's not a good guy."

When told of an Ivy professor's comment in a recent issue of the campus paper to the effect that anti-intellectualism and the fear of apple-polishing were not noticeably on the wane on the Ivy campus, the panel agreed that there was a natural fear of "apple-polishing" and that anti-intellectualism did exist. It is important to note that they saw anti-intellectualism as a term which was not necessarily derogative. They felt that what one found on campus was a value placed not only on intellectual activities but *on other things as well.* What they objected to were those men who studied and did nothing else and "who always had their nose in a book" and "knew their courses backwards and forwards." As one student commented, "I don't know anyone who would prefer to stay in his room and study rather than go out and play a little tennis or go down to the tavern and drink." In brief, the panel felt that anti-intellectualism was a perfectly acceptable attitude where the term referred to the relative emphasis placed on intellectual activities as opposed to other sorts of activities.

When asked about the value placed on grades, the panel felt that a B or C average is acceptable, but went on to distinguish between the over-all average and the grades in major subjects. The over-all average should be high enough to keep one in college with the grades in major subjects generally being one grade higher than those in electives. For example, a B for the major and a C for the electives would be adequate. When emphasis on higher grades occurs, it tends to be connected with an expectation of post-graduate work. One factor that makes the C acceptable is the general feeling that a C at Ivy is equal to an A in most other colleges.

The Ivy student's intellectual idea was described as interest in and enjoyment of a number of fields. However, ability to do a variety of things is not enough. One should not be deceived by the false well-rounded man: one who appears to have broad interests but somehow does not "follow through." The "real article" is one who is able to say, "I get 60 seconds out of every minute." Ideally, it is not necessary for the intellectual who is also well-rounded to "double clutch" at examination time. He should be able to take it as "cool" as did Mr. Goodman whose approach to examinations was recorded in the college paper:

Popular Stimulants Net Goodman A Plus

Charles Goodman, an English major, felt uncomfortable in his Sociology 209 course final exam.

After the first 45 minutes, he had completed all of the questions on the three-hour examination, but other students were still busily working. So he left his paper and ventured down to a local bar, where he quaffed numerous beers for 45 more minutes. Then he returned and was second man to turn in his paper.

Yesterday, with deep concern, he looked at the bulletin board. His grade: an A plus.

B. *The Nature of College Work.* A second factor prominently associated with study habits is the nature of the assignments imposed upon the student by the official culture. The panel suggests that AB's tend to study in fits and starts and are more likely to "double clutch" when exam time arrives than are engineers. Even those members of the panel who reported they kept up with assignments did so on a rather indefinite schedule. They studied for no specific number of hours each day, such as two, or three, or four hours a day. Nor did they have specific periods during the day which were designated for study purposes, such as evenings from 9 p.m.-11 p.m., or afternoons from 3 p.m.-4 p.m. Rather, the general tendency was to work when they "could" or "felt like it" or "had to" and somehow get their work done when it was due. The culture did not specifically define when one should study, aside from the general area of "when you can," but it was more or less explicit about when one should *not* study: for example, weekday evenings after midnight and Saturdays. It was suggested that such a pattern of study is made possible by the nature of the work in liberal arts courses. Where one has long-term assignments, one can either work on them at regular intervals or delay until shortly before they are due. Also, the nature of the content is such that one can put off weekly assignments and make them up later, whereas courses in engineering and the sciences often necessitate the faithful execution of daily assignments. In the latter departments one assignment builds upon the previous one and cannot be mastered unless the previous one has been mastered. Thus, at the end of a term it is considerably easier for a student to read several novels in English or a textbook in history than it is for a science or engineering major to begin seriously studying the work in his courses.

That engineers and science majors should traditionally have the reputation of being "the hardest workers" or at least the "most worked" students on campus can partially be accounted for on the basis that the nature of their work necessitates it. Thus, while liberal arts students are more often seen relaxing at bull sessions, cards, or the movies, engineers and science majors are more often seen on their way to or from the laboratories and working on daily assignments. It should be pointed out, however, that the amount of time spent on school work by these men is often inversely proportional to their mathematical ability, since so much of their work depends on a knowledge of mathematics. A student who is good in mathematics can often do his work in less time than a liberal arts student, particularly where the

latter is given long assignments and where the emphasis is not on problem solution, formula memorization, and the mastering of fairly specific facts, but on interpretation and the subtleties of esthetic appreciation. Although all men report they work hard around exam times, panel discussions suggest that the task of preparing for exams is easier for the engineer than for the liberal arts major. The nature of the work in conjunction with the AB and BS or BE degrees thus favors the adoption of essentially different patterns of studying.

C. *Institutionalized Delay.* A third factor contributing to the existence of different study habits is what we may refer to as "institutionalized delay." This occurs particularly in the Department of Architecture where students traditionally leave their work until the last few hours before the final deadline.

D. *Lack of Supervision.* The fact that the completion of assignments is left almost entirely to the student's discretion gives the student great freedom with respect to how he handles his academic requirements. Little direct supervision of a continuing nature (such as the compulsory study halls of prep school life and the daily quizzes and assignments of most secondary schools) is in evidence. To survive in college society one must do a certain minimum of work to meet official requirements for passing and graduation, to be sure, but beyond this subsistence level the official culture pays little systematic and explicit attention to the way in which the student organizes his intellectual life. Occasionally students experience inward pressures to exceed the subsistence level and these pressures arise from felt needs to "keep the scholarship" or "get accepted in graduate or medical school" or from a general desire to excel. For the most part, there is little in the student culture to encourage intensive efforts to excel with respect to grades. Rather, the theme of "well-roundedness" exerts pressure on the student to spend his time on other than intellectual activities once his continued existence has been assured by the meeting of minimal requirements. As one student observed, "I'd rather see a man participate in extracurricular activities and sacrifice his average than be a Phi Bete or honor student and do nothing else." And as another observed, "If you're going to be an average guy you have to participate. You can't get along if you're just a student and nothing else." Hence, it is only the student with exceptional ability who can simultaneously receive the best marks and meet the demands of "well-roundedness" which the culture imposes. Every student is faced with the problem of what to do with a limited amount of time, and this problem usually takes the form of reconciling his own interests and needs with the demands of the official and student cultures.

E. *Contacts with Authority Figures.* The nature of the contacts the student has with older authority figures may influence his academic behavior. The panel reports that there is comparatively little faculty-student contact. Where contact does occur it is usually on the formal level of the classroom situation where there is a clearly structured teacher-pupil relationship. There are, however, some differences by year and by department. In general, there is more informal contact with faculty in upper-class years than in lower-class years, especially in connection with junior independent work and the senior thesis. There the students report they experience closer and more meaningful interpersonal communication and get to know at least one member of the faculty on more intimate terms than the class room or even the seminar situation would permit. In some departments, particularly the smaller ones, faculty-student relations tend to be more informal and meaningful than in other departments.

A similar situation arises with respect to the parent-son relationship. The panel members report their parents exert little pressure on them to excel academically. The typical parental concern is that the son meet the college survival standards and eventually graduate. The parents tend to be relatively uninformed about different aspects of the college's curriculum and about the courses their sons are taking. They give little advice in this connection, apparently regarding this as the proper function of the college. It may well be that the parents can do no more than this because of difference in age and outlook, physical isolation from the campus, and general unfamiliarity with the changing nature of university education. In any event, the important point is that the students do not draw on their parents for advice nor do they seem to draw heavily on the official culture, either teaching or advisory personnel, except where required to do so. One can only assume then that the students rely on their own judgment or that of their peers. In either event, one would expect the same result: a reinforcement of student culture.

It is interesting to note that the most meaningful and sustained contacts some students have with college authority figures are with the athletic personnel. The typical coach-player relationship is described as much more informal and close than the typical teacher-student relationship. By definition, the coach primarily exemplifies and is concerned with values and activities which are other than intellectual. Thus, for some students, one has the situation of non-intellectual values being reinforced by some college authority figures (the athletic personnel), and intellectual values not being reinforced to an equal extent by other college authority figures (the teaching personnel). Given a person who is a product of American culture, where the professional athlete is for the most part more prestigeful than the professional intellect, and introducing that person to the college scene, it is not surprising that his tendency toward anti-intellectualism does not disappear or often not even noticeably diminish.

Intellectual Activity and Student Development. The panel reported that the transition from secondary school to college tended to be a difficult one and that the degree of difficulty experienced varied with the individual in terms of his abilities and background. Nevertheless, every student faced two types of academic problems. The first, as indicated earlier, was the nature of the work at college. Panel members reported that at college less work was done for them by the teacher, in the sense of extensive organization of course material. The lecture system was new to many. Assignments were given over a longer period of time and their length often was such that the student had to be selective in determining what was important and what was not important in his assignments. There also tended to be a decrease in the amount of direct

supervision of study and a corresponding increase in the necessity for learning how to organize one's time. In short, the students had to assume a greater degree of responsibility for their own work.

One of the most striking changes experienced was that of moving from the secondary school situation where although examinations were closely supervised cheating existed, to the Ivy situation where an honor system functioned in place of faculty supervision and where cheating was viewed as a taboo activity by the peer culture. As one student said of his high school, "an honest man has to cheat to get through." Another man, recalling his prep school days, said that he always used to cheat because he felt it unfair to be asked to read the daily assignment. However, he does not cheat at college because of the honor system, adding that it was quite an adjustment to make. The change in behavior with regard to cheating occurs rather suddenly in the freshman year. First, incoming men have to sign a paper saying that they will abide by the honor system. Then, even though there might remain a tendency to cheat, they soon notice that no one else is doing so and abide by the rule. By the end of four years the honor system has become so accepted that a senior is able to make the statement, "Our guys are shocked by guys from other universities who cheat."

The second type of problem faced by each student was learning the standards of the new environment and then living up to them. In learning the new standards the student was often handicapped by a conception of himself as a student with a particular amount of ability—a conception which had been formed in his secondary school years. High school boys particularly reported that they entered college thinking they were "A" students on the basis of the marks they had received in secondary school, and were often shocked to learn that it took considerably more ability and work to get equivalent grades in college. Prep school students generally had experienced a more realistic grading process and had had more intensive training in their subjects and thus found the transition somewhat easier, but they too still faced the initial problem of learning "what was required of them" by the new environment. One standard they had to learn which was not directly related to course work and formal academic requirements was the attitude the student body had toward intellectual activity. The panel felt, on the whole, that the student culture supported more intellectual activity and a greater interest in serious ideas than did the secondary school culture. A student could be interested in serious ideas and engage in intellectual activity to an extent which in secondary school would be likely to earn him the label of "pansy." However, while learning that one could engage in more intellectual activity than before, the student also had to learn the upper limits of such activity which were permissible to the student body. He could not "go all out" for such activity *unless* he was simultaneously devoting himself to other areas of college life. In summary, the student entering college had to adjust to the different nature of college work and learn the standards of the new environment, which ranged from formal standards of grades and the honor system to informal standards of permissible amounts of work which the student's peers endorsed. The latter process is known to the students as "getting on to the system." The picture of the initial transition one gets from the panel is that of students spending their first few months trying to discover "where they stand" as individuals in relation to the formal standards of the college. Once they feel secure in this respect, one finds increasing concern for the informal standards of the peer group. Thus, by sophomore year one finds more mention of "the system" and of "curve-wreckers." This implies that there is a general tendency for the student to have learned what the formal standards are and exactly what amount of work is necessary to get certain grades. As one student remarked, "Freshmen usually work harder than sophomores because they feel they have to know everything while the sophomore knows you can get by with less."

Once the initial transition is successfully experienced there is little change in the student's intellectual patterns until his upper-class years, where, as previously mentioned, he comes in closer contact with the faculty through his department and particularly through his junior independent work and senior thesis. There is some evidence that in senior year the emphasis again shifts from the peer group to the individual. Although there seems to be a general pattern of delaying the commencement of thesis work until the last minute (particularly because of time absorbed by fraternity life and football season), students tend to think more about themselves as they prepare for life after graduation. Students particularly concerned with their grades are those who are applying for some graduate or professional school, acceptance to which often depends on the student's academic performance in his senior year. Other students are concerned with finding a job in their chosen field of interest.

In general the undergraduates are conscious of the change in their behavior. They recognize that the freshman usually works harder than the sophomore and suggest that the average upperclassman's work is inspired by interest, in contrast with that of the underclassman who is not as interested in his work. This difference probably results from the fact that seniors do the bulk of their work in their major, or in electives which have been chosen for their interest value.

In summary, the panel reports that with the exception of cheating little past behavior is dropped. The most important aspects of past behavior which are intensified at college or of behavior newly learned by the individual are: the adjustment to an honor system, the acceptance of responsibility for doing the work on time, the learning of methods of note-taking in lectures, the selection of the important parts of reading assignments which are often too long to be read in their entirety, and the writing of essay exams.

From the viewpoint of the student, the net effect of the college intellectual experience was to "broaden and sharpen" him. Specifically they learned to "appreciate a book a lot more," to "understand opera," to "think better," etc. From the viewpoint of the outside observer, the college culture supported more intellectual activity than was probably condoned by the peer culture of secondary school, thus facilitating the attainment of the above benefits. However, at the same time, the student culture operated to limit the amount of intellectual activity through the equal value it placed on other activities in its emphasis on the well-rounded man.

Summary and Conclusions

The preceding pages have attempted to picture selected aspects of the undergraduate life of a college as that life is seen through the eyes of a panel of upperclassmen. The undergraduate body has been conceptualized not as a mere collection of individual undergraduates, but as a group exhibiting shared patterns of thought and behavior; in brief, as a group with its own distinctive culture. The culture has been viewed as one of many aspects of the college environment to which the student must adjust himself during the four years of his college education. Since the evidence from the panel suggests that for the average undergraduate there is less continuous contact with other aspects of the college environment such as the faculty and coaches, and with non-college aspects such as family and girl friends, than with the peer culture, it would appear that the culture is the most important single external factor in the student's experience. Most of his time is spent with his peers. The small size and relatively homogeneous nature of the student body tends to promote conformity and group solidarity and this tendency is reinforced by situational factors such as the geographical location of Ivy, the absence of cars, the presence of a fraternity system, and the fact that all students must live in university dormitories on campus.

In attempting to describe the major cultural patterns in two areas of undergraduate life, the authors have emphasized the "average"—what most undergraduates do and think in these areas. In so doing, the students who represent extremes in deviation from the main patterns have been largely neglected. This is not regarded as a serious shortcoming of the study, for in presenting the culture as one aspect of the student's environment to which he must adjust, it is more important to stress what the majority do, as the patterns of the majority are those with which the student is most likely to come in contact, of which he is most likely to be aware, and to which he must make some sort of response whether positive or negative. Moreover, evidence from the panel seems to indicate that, aside from the under- and upper-class cultures, there are no clearly definable sub-cultures within the undergraduate society. On an individual level, the typical student sees his fellow student not just as an athlete or as an outing clubber or as a junior Phi Bete, but as an Ivy man who is *also* on the varsity hockey team, who is a history major, who has a C average, who is a member of a fraternity, who is on the staff of the college paper, who is a "good guy" and gets along with everyone, who dates, smokes, drinks, etc. In brief, the individual student presents a configurational stimulus to other students and it is the nature of the configuration which determines the response other students will make to him. He is accepted as an Ivy man because of his enrollment at Ivy and his presence on campus, but how "good" an Ivy man he is and how well he is accepted by other students depends on "other attributes." The student who presents a configuration which represents a variety of interests and abilities in many areas of life is judged to be "well-rounded" and is more readily accepted than one who presents a configuration which is "lopsided" in some respect. The configuration which may be described in terms of "well-roundedness" is the one which the undergraduate value system most highly endorses and rewards.

The pressure directed toward the molding of the "well-rounded man" seems to have the effect of reducing extremes in the student body and, correspondingly, of increasing the homogeneity of the student body. The "naturally shy and reticent" are "brought out;" the "overly studious" are "broadened" to the point where other things besides books and intellectual matters become of importance; the "Christ-smitten" are mellowed into a less moralistic and more social or democratic frame of mind, and so forth. In brief, the student's scope of interests and range of activities is broadened and balanced.

The panel interviews and the descriptions of cliques by the panel members seem to indicate that the system operates with considerable ease. As deviants from the "well-rounded" ideal are molded to fit the ideal, it becomes increasingly easier to perpetuate that ideal, for the more people in the group who are "well-rounded," the more models the newcomer has to imitate. The psychic rewards of "belonging" are such that one finds it "uncomfortable" to deviate too far from the ideal. Social pressures, of a largely informal but yet overt nature, are applied by the individual's clique to the point where he must conform in most respects to the clique's norms if he is to "belong." Since cliques are apparently loosely organized on campus and since most cliques exhibit essentially similar behavior, it makes little difference to what clique one belongs. The individual chooses his friends for similarity of interests, but other cliques are not strikingly different. However, those individuals who deviate from the main norms on campus are aware of their deviation and the only sense of "belonging" they can achieve, if they are not to conform to the ideal, is to clique with others who are "different from the average guy."

Thus it would seem that there are two major alternative paths of development open to the student at Ivy. He can be subjected to the molding process and be richly rewarded, or he can join an "outgrouper" clique whereby his interests are not appreciably changed. In this situation he may achieve the same sense of belonging to a group, but he is simultaneously aware he does not belong to the larger group and is not sharing its rewards.

The relative importance of culture as an external factor for the development of any particular individual depends on the presence or absence of other external factors and on the strength of those factors. For some, the most influential aspect of their experience during the college years may be a possessive mother or an overbearing father. For others it may be one or two professors who succeed in stimulating a deep intellectual interest within the student. In brief, the development of any individual is a function of many factors of which undergraduate culture is one. The present study has attempted to describe some aspects of the Ivy culture which is viewed as one factor in the student's experience to which he must adjust, one way or another.

The Making of a Physician —

General Statement of Ideas and Problems

*Everett C. Hughes**

Social scientists are being called upon more and more to study training for the various professions and to consult with those who make policy with reference to it. The following pages suggest a general frame of reference for such study. They were written for several people, both medical educators and social scientists, who were thinking of embarking on a modest study tracing the course of students through the maze of a particular medical school. There resulted a day-long discussion which was of great value in planning the study. It was more like a prolonged group interview than a formal discussion. While the ideas refer specifically to medicine, they implicitly refer to other professions as well.

The Medical Culture

Each of the great historic professions is concerned with not just a set of techniques for doing some useful work, but with some aspect of life and/or society, itself. And when, as often happens, an occupation—either an old one transformed by technical or social changes, or a new one—claims for itself the status of profession, it is saying to the world that—like the professions—the work it does has somehow become a matter of broad public concern.

Medicine is the prototype of the professions in this regard. As Sigerist so well demonstrates in the first chapter of his work,[1] a history of medicine is a history of human society and culture, of its metaphysics as well as of its physics, of its basic philosophy of nature, of its ideas of health and disease, of the processes of therapy (faith, magic, science, and arts), and its notions about the proper economy and distribution of goods and services, including healing services and facilities.

These ideas, the health and illness aspect of a culture, are never the sole possession and certainly never the exclusive creation of those who devote themselves to the healing arts. On the other hand, the medical culture of the dominant healing profession (or professions, for they are not so united in all as in our own culture) never coincides exactly with that of the lay world. The relations between professional medical culture and lay medical culture have varied a great deal; in our part of the world, most of the population accepts the basic assumptions of the former. This is still not so in many parts of the world; and where it is not, the medical profession faces special problems. But even in our world the lay public, or parts of it in varying degree, does not accept all the assumptions, nor the therapeutic and preventive measures based upon them. Furthermore, the accumulation of medical knowledge and art has become so great that those without special training are, perhaps, relatively further from the professional in relevant knowledge and skill than in earlier periods. In a sense, we are more dependent upon the professionals for medical services than were our ancestors. By the same token, only some small portion of medical knowledge and skill can be mastered by each member of the profession itself, which leads to there being sub-cultures within the greater professional medical culture. This is also more than a matter of technique and knowledge; it has roots in ideas and assumptions. One can, with some truth, speak of the medical philosophy, perhaps even of the moral, social, or economic philosophy of the various specialties; one can at least speak of differences of emphasis among them. Some of the specialties may even be said to have their own lay publics—people who accept their basic philosophy and who favor their approach to diagnosis and treatment rather than others.

Medical culture goes far beyond these approaches. For one thing, an approach to health may carry implications about the relations of physicians to each other, about the degrees of cooperation necessary and/or desirable among them. For another, from the very nature of their work, physicians can-

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1. Henry E. Sigerist, *A History of Medicine*, Vol. 1, *Primitive and Archaic Medicine*, New York, 1951, "Introduction," pp. 3-101.

not refrain from having opinions about the relations of physicians to patients, to the public, and to the many other occupations, enterprises and institutions involved in health activities. Professionals and laymen might accept the same assumptions about the nature of disease and its treatment, yet differ strongly on the proper relations of the various parties involved. Indeed, among both laity and the profession there are differences on many of these points which may or may not be related to specialties, differences in social, ethnic, or regional background and so on.

However these things may be, it is beyond dispute that there is an immense and elaborate medical culture in our world, and that the knowledge and attitudes that make it up are distributed in various ways among laity and the medical profession and related occupations.

Medical Education

Medical education is the whole series of processes by which the medical culture is kept alive (which means more than merely imparted) through time and generations, by which it is extended to new populations or elements of the population, and by which it is added to through new learning and experiment. The education of the medical profession is part of it. For our immediate purposes we will use the phrase medical education only for the training and initiation of physicians, although there is a certain danger of distortion in using it in so limited a way. The education of the members of the medical profession is a set of planned and unplanned experiences by which laymen, usually young and acquainted with the prevailing lay medical culture, become possessed of some part of the technical and scientific medical culture of the professionals. The starting point is the lay medical culture; the end point varies, although the learning experiences are somewhat standardized and although all must take standard examinations to be licensed. But the end point is not there, for in varying ways and degrees the professionals must bring what they have learned into effective interaction with the lay medical culture again. But with a difference—for they themselves are in a new role.

Part of the medical culture of the lay world is some set of conceptions about the proper role of the physician and a set of beliefs about the extent to which he lives up to the role so conceived, and the extent to which and the ways in which he falls short. Initiation into a new role is as much a part of medical training as is the learning of techniques; indeed, part of it is to learn the techniques of playing the roll well. A role is always a part in some system of interaction of human beings; it is always played opposite other roles. To play one is not to play another. One might say that the learning of the medical role consists of a separation, almost an alienation, of the student from the lay medical world; a passing through the mirror so that one looks out on the world from behind it, and sees things as in mirror writing. In all of the more esoteric occupations we have studied we find the sense of seeing the world in reverse.

The period of initiation into the role appears to be one wherein the two cultures, lay and professional, interact within the individual. Such interaction undoubtedly goes on all through life, but it seems to be more lively—more exciting and uncomfortable, more self-conscious and yet perhaps more deeply unconscious—in the period of learning and initiation. To take one example, the layman has to learn to live with the uncertainty if not of ignorance, at least of lack of technical knowledge of his own illnesses; the physician has to live with and act in spite of the more closely calculated uncertainty that comes with knowing the limits of medical knowledge and his own skill.

In the process of change from one role to another there are occasions when other people expect one to play the new role before one feels completely identified with it or competent to carry it out; there are others in which one overidentifies oneself with the role, but is not accepted in it by others. These and other possible positions between roles make of an individual what is called a marginal man; either he or other people or both do not quite know to what role (identity, reference group) to refer him. We need studies which will discover the course of passage from the laymen's estate to that of the professional, with attention to the crises and the dilemmas of role which arise.

Stereotype and reality.—We assume that anyone embarking upon the road to medicine has some set of ideas about what the work (skills and tasks) of the physician is, about what the role is, what the various medical careers are, and about himself as a person who may learn the skills, play the role, and follow one of the possible career-lines. We assume also that except in cases of extraordinary early contact with the profession, the medical aspirant's conceptions of all these things are somewhat simpler than the reality, that they may be somewhat distorted and stereotyped among lay people. Medical education becomes, then, the learning of the more complicated reality on all these fronts. It may turn out that it makes a good deal of difference whether the steps toward a more penetrating and sophisticated reality on one of these points come early or late, and whether the reality is learned from supporting teachers and colleagues or rubbed in by punishing cynics or stubborn and uncomprehending patients. It may be that the more complicated reality is in some circumstances traumatic, in others, exciting and even inspiring. Perhaps some aspects of reality can be learned in an early phase of technical training and experience, while others can be effectively learned only at some later point. There has always been considerable talk in educational institutions about what kinds of things are prerequisites for others; only in a few cases does it appear really to be known what should come first, what later—there are those who say that geometry should come before algebra, not after. Some question the time-honored custom of having students learn anatomy from cadavers rather than from demonstrations with living persons. In the study of professional education, we have suggested a distinction between various kinds of prerequisites: conventional and symbolic, technical and role-learning. Learning the realities of medical skills, roles and careers may move *pari passu;* or it may be that some of the roles can be really learned only when a certain level of skill has been attained and certain career corners turned. The realities about career problems might at some points put a damper

on the student's eagerness to learn skills and roles; at another point, a new knowledge of career realities might be a stimulus to work on the other fronts.

In professional, as in other lines of work, there grows up both inside and outside some conception of what the essential work of the occupation is or should be. In any occupation, people perform a variety of tasks, some of them approaching more closely the ideal or symbolic work of the profession than others. Some tasks are considered nuisances and impositions, or even dirty work—physically, socially or morally beneath the dignity of the profession. Part of what goes on with respect to a major aspect of life at whose center is a profession, such as the medical, is a constant sorting and resorting of the tasks involved among many kinds of people—inside the profession, in related professions, and clear outside professional ranks. The preparation of drugs, the taking of blood pressures, the giving of anaesthetics, the keeping of medical records, the collection of bills, the cleaning up of operating rooms, the administration of hospitals—these are but a few of the tasks which have been allocated and reallocated within the medical division of labor in fairly recent years. There is constant discussion of what is whose work in medicine and what part of it all is the physician's work, privilege and duty. We assume that the medical student is inducted into the discussion of these problems, and that it has some effect upon his motivation and his sense of mission. We may suppose that the essential, symbolically-valued part of the physician's work is diagnosis and treatment of the ailments of people, and that the other activities are—in theory at least—tolerated only as they appear necessary to it. What, then, are considered essential auxiliary or peripheral activities, and what attitudes do physicians hold toward them and the people who perform them. Hospitals must be administered, and there are some who believe that physicians alone should do it. Yet, physicians do not ordinarily gain great prestige by becoming administrators—indeed, some who are say they are scarcely considered medical colleagues any longer. On the other hand, there is some tendency for auxiliary activities to become valued ends in themselves, sometimes even getting in the way of the presumed basic activity (as discipline becomes an end in itself in schools and, some say, in nursing).

The increasing variety of the central and, symbolically, most valued of medical activities themselves is reflected in the number of medical specialities. Some of the specialities are rated above others both by laymen and the profession, although these ratings are not necessarily the same. We may assume that as the student learns various skills and sees at closer hand the actual tasks of his future trade, he will undergo changes of attitude toward them as components of medical work.

Just as certain tasks and skills of medical work are rated above others, so also are the men who perform them. But we must remember that the various medical tasks differ from each other not merely in the knowledge and technical skill required, but in the social relations and social roles involved. The model member of the profession is a man of certain skills and knowledge, one who keeps proper balance between the more and the less valued activities of the profession, and who plays his role well in relation to himself, his colleagues, other personnel in medical work, and toward his patients and the public. As in other professions, we may find that some models are—like the saints—considered a little too good for ordinary men to be expected to imitate in daily practice, although they are admired as embodiments of the highest values of the profession. A study of medical education should discover not merely the saintly models, but also those the student regards as more practically (even a bit cynically) attainable by himself, the mold being as it is, and he being who he is. The shift in choice of models by the student, his definite steps or his drifting into the path that leads to one model rather than others, is a significant part of his medical education. This is, of course, not merely choice of specialty, but of various ways of practicing medicine: practice, teaching, research; practice in one social environment rather than another: rural or urban, well-off or poor, where the health standard of living is high or is low, among his own or among other kinds of people; alone or in association with others; for salary or for fees; where competition is keen or where there is more security, etc. These matters may all enter as components into models to be admired or followed, which is to say that, as suggested above, a model in effect embodies the whole professional ideology of those who choose it.

The models of the medical world are, of course, not free of influence from the ideologies of other aspects of modern life. We should investigate the extent to which the image of the model businessman has colored that of the model physician. Although the world of business uses the term *private entrepreneur* there is plenty of evidence that the model businessman is seen as a team worker rather than a person who goes it alone. It is possible that in some respects the medical model is a hangover from the outmoded one of the business world. Given current trends in medical organization, it seems obviously important to discover not merely the extent to which the go-it-alone model prevails as against the team-work model, but also to find out what influences continue to reinforce it.

The conception of the model physician contains, by implication, clues to the nature of the model patient. There may be a good deal of ambivalence on this point, since few students are so unrealistic as to believe they can get a practice consisting of only one kind of patient (as to troubles, personal, social, or economic characteristics), or so divinely endowed and blissfully ambitious that they can in fact get such a clientele. It is recognized, too, that all people must be served in some fashion. Yet there are conceptions of the ideal patient: about what is wrong with him, about his social and economic characteristics, about his acceptance of the physician's authority and prescriptions, his understanding, his cooperation and his gratitude. There are apparently at least three important components in these conceptions: the nature of the illness and its amenability to treatment; the nature of the interaction between the patient in his role with the physician in his; and, finally, the effect of the patient on the physician's career (income, reputation, development of further skill, fulfillment of his self-concept as a physician).

We have said little directly about the nature of social roles, and will make only a few remarks on the subject

since, by implication, the problem of role is found throughout. In one sense, a role is what a man expects of himself and what others expect of him in certain situations. People sometimes expect miracles of physicians; the physician has to learn how to handle this expectation in such a way as to give his patients both the best chance of getting well and the least chance of disillusionment. This is the eternal problem of helping people to face uncertainty, or unwelcome certainty (as the case may be), the problem of maintaining balance in the relations between the more skilled partner (the physician) and the less skilled, but more crucially-affected partner (the patient). Man of understanding, man of patience, confidante, advisor, pillar of strength—and their opposites—these are terms having to do with roles, rather than with techniques as such.

They all involve other people, or oneself considered in one's relations to other people. Everyone has to work out the weights he will give to the various parties to the work drama in which he has a role. Will he play it for the patients alone, dramatizing himself as their champion against the profession itself? Taken to the extreme, this is quackery in a strict sociological sense, whether or not the man be competent in his methods of diagnosis and practice. There are people who play their roles before their colleagues alone, or before some of their colleagues rather than others; still others may be moved by peculiar conceptions of their own rights and duties, impervious alike to colleague and patient. These may be the true missionaries, the sectarians who have no judge except God himself. Every man finds his "significant others," with whom he identifies himself so that he listens to their voices rather than to others. This is what is meant by the recently-adopted term, "reference group." Since there are a number of crucial reference groups in modern medicine, it becomes part of the problem of the student to find some balance between his sensitivity to them, his own configuration of significant others. Different configurations may be associated with selection of the specialties and the ways of practicing mentioned above.

It is also likely that as he goes through the medical education, the aspirant will veer from one toward another of his significant others; at one time feeling the aches and pains of the patient more acutely than the patients themselves; at another sharing the angry cynicism of those colleagues who say, in their hour of disillusion with ungrateful humanity, that the only thing to do is get yours while you can; at another, feeling the exhilaration of wonder-working, and yielding a bit to the blandishments of admiring nurses, students, and grateful patients; and at still another, suffering the pangs of uncertainty of his trade and feeling sorry for himself.

This leads to the problem of self-conception and discovery of self. One person's conception of himself is itself something of a stereotype, to which parents, teachers, siblings, peers, and his own dreams have contributed. Some people project themselves far into the future, others operate more or less in the present. But in either case, there come moments of necessary revision and adjustment of one's notions about what he can do and wants to do. One may say, then, that a young man thinking about himself as a physician is thinking about a young man as yet somewhat unknown to himself, doing work and playing roles not yet known, in situations he has never yet been in. This is not to underestimate the anticipatory playing of roles; but no matter how sensitive the individual's anticipation of himself in a future role, there is some gap between anticipation and realization. Certainly, there are more young men in premedical school who think of themselves as potential surgeons than can ever be surgeons, given the qualities necessary and the proportion of the medical profession who make their living as such. There are also fewer who expect to end up in public health than actually will. As he proceeds through medical training and into practice, the young man may be expected to get not merely a better notion of the skills required, of the tasks to be performed, of the roles to be played, and of the positions to be attained in the medical world and the roads which lead toward them, but also to adjust his conception of his own mental, physical and personal aptitudes, his tastes and distastes, and of the chances that a person of his particular social and economic qualities and family circumstances may acquire the skills, the roles and the positions available.

This is an economics of self-conception. The importance of this to the distribution of physicians among specialties and ways of practicing is obvious. Again we have to deal with the problems of fateful or crucial choice. A person may make a discovery about himself only after he has passed the point of crucial decision to do the kind of work he would now like to have been able to do. In the concrete, this means that one cannot enter medicine at all unless one has had certain schooling by a certain age; that some specialties have to be adopted far earlier than others; that some require a longer period of doing without income; that a wife who is a handicap in one kind of practice might be a great asset in another; that, while one can master the skills of a certain specialty, one has no taste or aptness for the social roles required. A study of the progressive self-discovery of students passing through the maze of medical school and training might be used by those who plan the experiences which have a bearing on the choice of effective models, of specialties, and of the ways and places of practice by medical students.

Career. One of the problems in the study of a profession is to discover the career-lines of people who follow it. This in turn requires identification of the significant phases of careers, and the sequences in which they occur. Sequences occur in all the matters we have discussed thus far. Some of them are institutionalized—as the sequence from pre-medical phase, to medical student, to intern, resident, practicing physician, diplomat of a specialty body, etc. Others are not so formally institutionalized and named, but are well known. Still others are more or less unnoticed or not admitted (but nevertheless often anticipated or feared) regularities of change from one ill-defined phase to another. One changes from a young man with teachers and mentors to whom he may turn, into an older man who has become a teacher and a sponsor, even a father-figure to younger men. Or one finds that one has less time for the clinic and the laboratory because of the increase of administrative demands upon one's time. One aspect of career is just these shifts from one

weighting or combination of activities to another. It is well known that these shifts are accompanied by anxieties, such as shown in the dream of a young woman who had just been made a supervisor of nursing in a large hospital. She dreamed that she suddenly had to get a patient into a respirator at night, and that she had either forgotten how, or else a new model had been brought in—and she fumbled while the patient gasped. The shift from one kind of activity to another entails the danger of losing a skill; it is also a shift from one kind of responsibility to another, from one role to another.

There are, in any kind of career line, points of negative and positive crucial decision. For example, if I have not received my specialty residence in a certain kind of hospital by a certain age, certain further steps are closed. There is also always before a young man the question of whether, when, and how often to move from one place of work to another. Some lines of work, and some specialties within medicine, show different patterns of relation between moving and success. One would expect that the career of a man going into private practice might be crucially affected by his first choice of a place to practice than is the career of a man who goes in for pathology, teaching, or any of the specialties in which work for salary is the rule. There is, in institutions or systems, a certain balance between home-guard success and itinerant success. The home-guard are the people who make their careers with little or no itineracy; the itinerants progress by moving from one place or institution to another. Those who get ahead by moving—from say, smaller to larger schools or hospitals—have to decide whether to move in a small orbit (state or region) or in a large, perhaps national or international, orbit. The decision, or the fact—whether it be by conscious decision or by default—of operating in a small or in a large orbit involves the choice of significant others (reference groups), the people on whose good opinion one stakes one's reputation; those whom one can afford to pay less attention to; and those, perhaps, from whom one must dissociate oneself. It involves, in short, the choice of his closer colleagues, the people who will refer cases to him, the people who will think of him when they want a teammate, the people who see his potentialities and help him to realize them.

Career is, in fact, a sort of running adjustment between a man and the various facts of life and of his professional world. It involves the running of risks, for his career is his ultimate enterprise, his laying of his bets on his one and only life. It contains a set of projections of himself into the future, and a set of predictions about the course of events in the medical world itself. Much is to be learned about career lines, how they are conceived by the students of medicine and how their personal and social backgrounds, school and other training experiences, predispose to turn them in one or another of the many directions in which a medical man may go. It is the sum total of these dispositions and turnings that gives us the kind of distribution of physicians we have among the various ways of practicing and the various places and settings within which medicine is practiced, whether that distribution be good or poor.

We are in a time of great change in the institutions of medicine. Not only is their inner structure changing so that the available positions and careers and the demands made upon those who fill them are in flux both in number and kind, but there are more and more ancillary institutions, more and more connections of medicine with the other concerns and institutions of the world. The younger physician's projection of himself into the future is consequently a projection with more unknowns in it than ever before. The whole trend of the system itself is something of an unknown. So that the problem becomes in part that of adjusting to running, never-completed adjustment. Some will doubtless accept the implications of such open-endedness more than others; some may indeed make it part of their identity to be men who do not seek a fixed identity, men whose constant is that they are open to change, or even men who seek the spots where change is the major assignment. Others may seek, successfully or not, the spots which appear most fixed, the bastions that appear safe from storming. We may find a home-guard of time, as well as of space.

We need studies which will run these various lines of inquiry concurrently, starting in the premedical phase and following the aspirant through into his early years of practice. That is, studies which take him from the time when he is most nearly like a layman in his medical culture, through the full cycle of whatever happens to him in school, to that time in the early years of practice when he is fully a member of the profession, both in his own mind and in that of most people who know him.

The Changing Character of South-Central Afghanistan Villages

*Louis Dupree**

Historical Background

Afghanistan is traditionally a land of independent, mutually hostile tribal kingdoms. Even Alexander the Great's historians commented on the disunity of the Afghan tribes. Until the 18th century A.D., the Afghans were seldom masters in their own house.

The history of modern Afghanistan began in 1747 when Ahmad Shah of Kandahar revolted against Safavid Iran and established an independent kingdom in south-central Afghanistan. Ahmad Shah extended his empire from Turkestan to Delhi, from Kashmir to the mouths of the Indus.

After the death of Ahmad Shah in 1773, his sons fought each other for control of the throne, and subsequently the empire fell apart. By 1818, the house of Ahmad Shah (Sadozai) had lost control of everything but Herat. The present ruling family of Afghanistan, the Muhammadzai, had established themselves in two of the major tribal kingdoms, Kandahar and Kabul.

Several attempts were made to unite the kingdoms, but tribal wars and two Anglo-Afghan wars (1839-42, 1878-80) made cohesion impossible. The Uzbegs of Turkestan alone had 10 separate *khanates*[1] in the 19th century. Czarist Russia, pushing toward Britain's Indian empire, kept the Central Asian political pot boiling. Although no central government existed before the time of Abdur Rahman in 1880, an occasional strong leader like Dost Mohammad, who ruled intermittently from 1834-63, was able to unite the three major amirates of Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar.

Before the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80) the sedentary Pathans of south-central Afghanistan (Kandahar and Farah provinces) lived in clan villages.[2] The ethnographic survey and maps of Lt. R. C. Temple[3] (1879) attest to this, and clan villages were reported near Farah as late as 1910 by Hamilton.[4] Probably no pure clan village ever existed, because "clients" (*hamsayas*) attached themselves to villages for protection. These *hamsayas* were used as farm labor.

A man's loyalties and obligations decreased roughly in the following order: family, clan, tribe, confederacy.[5] Confederacy and tribal loyalties were largely territorial, although Pathans believe that all have a common ancestor; clan and family loyalties are based on kinship, real or mythical.

The clan and clan leadership governed the actions of the village. Land was clan-owned, decisions to fight or move the village were made by the clan elders (heads of all families). Usually, the head of the most powerful clan was *malik* (village headman), and he represented the village in tribal functions.

Just before the end of the Second Afghan War, the British government seriously considered proposals to keep Afghanistan divided into several amirates, with the independence of each guaranteed by Britain. This plan, in theory, would have prevented consolidation of the Afghan tribes against British India and created a buffer zone against Russian expansion.[6]

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*This article deals with one facet of a village study undertaken in 1950-51 for the American Museum of Natural History, New York. It was presented in abbreviated form before the 1954 meeting of the Alabama Academy of Sciences at Huntington College, Montgomery, Ala. Dr. Dupree is currently working at the Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center, Research Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. The author wishes to thank Drs. C. S. Coon, Deric O'Bryan, and O. L. Austin, Jr. for reading and criticizing this manuscript.

1. Sir K. Frazer-Tytler, *Afghanistan,* 2nd ed., Oxford, New York, 1953, p. 56.

2. Terminology is that of Murdock (*Social Structure,* Macmillan, New York, 1949). The clan must have: unilinear descent (in this case, patrilineal), residential unity (patrilocal), social integration, which refers to a positive group settlement, including the fact that wives become a part of the group. A clan village (Murdock's "clan community") is a settlement in which all inhabitants belong to the same clan.

3. Lt. R. C. Temple, "Rough Notes on the Distribution of the Afghan Tribes About Kandahar," *Jour. of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,* LXVII, Part 1:3, Calcutta, 1879, pp. 181-185.

4. A. Hamilton, *Afghanistan,* Millet, New York, 1910.

5. See J. W. Spain, "Pakistan's North-West Frontier," *Middle East Jour.,* Vol. 8, pp. 27-40, 1954, for a general discussion of the mountain Pathan tribes of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province. Here, the clan and tribe are much stronger social forces than in South-central Afghanistan.

6. Lord F. S. Robert, *Forty-one Years in India,* Vol. 2, 2nd ed., Longmans, London, 1897, p. 312; and Frazer-Tytler, *op. cit.,* p. 148.

Into this confusion rode Abdur Rahman, a Muhammadzai who had been exiled to Russia by his brother, Sher Ali, the former amir. He was still wearing a Russian uniform when he reached Kabul, but in spite of this the British decided to gamble on his cooperation and personal strength to keep Afghanistan out of the Russian sphere. Abdur Rahman was recognized Amir of Kabul on August 10, 1880, and with the help of British money and military supplies prepared himself for the tribal wars which inevitably followed. In one instance, Ayub Khan proclaimed himself Amir of Herat, conquered Kandahar, and declared a holy war on Abdur Rahman for cooperating with the British.

Before his death in 1901, however, Abdur Rahman had slowly extended his control over all of modern Afghanistan. Revolts and feuds still occur; for example, the Khost rebellion of 1924-25, the ousting of the Amir Amanullah in 1929, and the short, almost bloodless, Hazara revolt of 1950.

Abdur Rahman instituted a spoils system for political appointments similar to that found in the United States. "While he educated his eldest son and successor, Habibullah, in the art of government and put him in charge of some of the affairs of state, he wisely avoided the great mistake of many of his predecessors of entrusting the government of outlying provinces to relatives and possible rivals. He promoted loyal subordinates to high posts while at the same time he instituted a system of spies and informers which enabled him to become aware of all possible intrigues against himself."[7] Today, the tendency is to keep the government a family preserve.

Abdur Rahman gave his governors and other officials an administrative *carte blanche* as long as they sent the allotted taxes and conscripts to Kabul. The spy system helped keep the officials honest. A manorial type of political organization grew out of this decentralization of authority.

The establishment of a relatively *stable* central government was an important step in preparing Afghanistan for a role in the modern world. It must be remembered that the most stable Middle Eastern governments are not always the most progressive.

The villagers and tribesmen, unused to recognizing any but tribal law, knew little about the actions of the Central Government; for them, the provincial government tended to take the place of the tribal nation. Unfortunately, the provincial and old tribal areas did not exactly coincide. Many tribes were split and divided between two or more provinces or sub-provinces. Any signs of discontent were immediately put down. The provincial army, under the command of the provincial governor (usually a military man), enforced the governor's dictums and the Amir's *firmans*. Thus, at least administratively, the provinces became quasi-independent states, taking the place of the independent tribal nations.

Although the governors had the right and obligation to collect taxes, they did not own the land. In south-central and southwestern Afghanistan, the right to collect taxes became confused, either consciously or unconsciously, with bona fide ownership of the land. Land was being sold and re-sold by government officials without any regard for the traditional joint ownership of village lands by the clan. The army was on hand to seal such transactions, if necessary.

In this situation, obviously, something had to give, and the tribal and clan organization began to disintegrate.

A somewhat similar episode occurred in Bengal just after the British occupation in the late 18th century: "In Bengal, the unwary Cornwallis and Shore mistook the existing hereditary tax-collectors for landowners and treated them as such, with the result that they created a new class of wealthy landholders at the expense of peasant proprietary rights, and many millions of lost revenue. . . . Warned by this example the next settlement in Madras was made direct with each peasant. In the north settlements were largely made with whole villages at a time."[8]

Land Tenure and Clan Disintegration in Badwan, 1951

Before generalizing further, let us examine some specific end results of the above processes at Badwan, a Pathan farming village about 15 miles southwest of Kandahar on the Arghandab River. What happened there—and is happening—appears to be typical of the villages of the Helmand and Arghandab valleys.

Although the male population of Badwan numbers less than 50 (only 27 are adults), five Pathan clans are represented, as well as a family of Sayyids, a Baluchi laborer, and a Bakhtiari man and his mother. The Pathan clans are Popolzai, Alachozai, Andar, Babal, and Kakar.

Forty separate fields (each of about 10 acres) are connected geographically to the village. Absentee landlords own 21 (52 percent) of these fields. The remaining 48 percent are owned by four native Badwanis; one man owns 10, another five, another three, and the headman of the village owns one field.

Only 20, exactly half, of the fields are farmed by Badwanis. The remaining 20 are plowed, planted, and harvested by farmers from neighboring villages. The decision as to who cultivates which field is entirely up to the absentee landlord or his appointed representative, a combination overseer and rent collector. Rent collectors usually live in Panjwai or Kandahar.

A man will not necessarily farm the same field for two consecutive years, since contracts between landlord and tenant are generally on a yearly basis. It is possible for the tenant to terminate a contract after one year, but such situations are rare. For example, the headman of Badwan agreed to tend a pomegranate orchard in the village owned by the Governor of the subprovince of Girishk. The one-year contract (1950) stipulated that the headman pay a 10,000 *afghanis* rental, the money remaining after the sale of the crop going to the headman. Unfortunately, 1950 was a bad year for pomegranates and, to worsen matters further, Pakistan had imposed a partial economic blockade on Afghan imports and exports in retaliation for the Afghan stand on the Pushtunistan question—thus preventing the flow of Afghan pomegranates to

7. Frazer-Tytler, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

8. P. Spear, *India, Pakistan and the West*, Oxford, London, 1952, pp. 134-35.

their best markets, India and Pakistan. Under these circumstances, the headman was able to sell the fruit for only 3,000 *afghanis* net. When we left the country (February, 1951) he had paid the governor 6,000 *afghanis,* 3,000 of which were out of his own savings, and had given him a note for the rest. Because of his position in the village, the headman could —and did—refuse to rent the orchard for 1951.

The population of Badwan changes annually as the landlords switch tenants from field to field and from village to village. In practice this system gets very complicated. A farmer can be moved to one village, and contract to work a field in a third village. This *split-farming* system, as I propose to call it, keeps the individual villages and groups of villages in a constant state of social upheaval. Any efforts to organize for clan or village projects is difficult under such conditions. As an extreme example, three brothers living together in Badwan farm three different fields in three different villages. Each field is owned by a different landlord.

From dawn to dusk, half of the Badwanis work fields miles away from their village, side by side with farmers from other villages. In few instances is there any opportunity for any organized activity or friendly intercourse.

Some do rebel against the split-farming system, but seldom openly. A resident landlord imported a new share-cropping family to Badwan while we were there. The new family lived in a room in the grain storage compound occupied by my wife and me. The family consisted of a Popolzai man, his wife, and two young daughters. No one in the village, other than the landlord, acknowledged the existence of the family for several days. Even his fellow clansmen ignored him. The new tenant informed me that he had farmed across the Arghandab at Pushmul the previous year, and had been shunted from village to village all his life. "Many of us are unhappy," he said.

Modern journalese has given the term "absentee landlord" an unhealthy connotation, and the abolition of absentee landlordism is proposed by some Westerners as a panacea for all Asia's ills. But landlords are not all Simon Legrees, and, conversely, not all peasants are simple, lovable folk. Many landlords are genuinely concerned about the economic levels of their tenants and are actively doing something about it. The system involves much give and take, with the farmer trying to cheat the rent collector, and the rent collector the landlord. The middleman (rent collector) serves as a safety valve—both the landlord and the peasant can give vent to their injustices (imagined or real) in his presence.

Many government officials, especially at the subprovincial level, are aware of the problems raised by the present land tenure system, and do their best to alleviate the rent and tax loads of the villagers.

Much individual economic competition is inherently present in the split-farming system. If a man does not succeed as a farmer he is fired or transferred (if in debt) to another village, but rarely are there other trades to which he can turn his hand. Since contracts are annually renewable, any tenant farmer can technically leave the employ of a landlord if he so desires, and *if* he can find another job. Competent farmers are always in demand, but the malcontents and incompetents must move often in search of new jobs.

However, a few landless farmers, because of prestige and personality, never shift from place to place, and never have any trouble finding work. The assistant headman of Badwan is an example of this. Formerly a landowner, his holdings had been washed away by capricious Arghandab spring floods about 20 years ago. His wife is dead, and he has only a teenaged daughter in his household, but he is a respected elder with great influence in the village. The landlords always make sure he is gainfully employed. It serves both their interests.

Conclusions: Land Reclamation and the Future

In spite of the breaking up of village solidarity and the clan organization, the split-farming system brings no hunger or other physical discomfort to the Badwanis. They are generally happy (a subjective word at best), and most express satisfaction with their niche in life. Even the resident landlords are subjected to many practical jokes, which they not only tolerate but seem to enjoy. But a lack of unity, group identity and purpose in village life can be sensed immediately.

Enough adult farmers live in Badwan to cultivate all the fields outside the village. If the fields were equally divided between the 27 adult males, each man would receive about one and one-half fields. Each field, as now demarcated, averages 10 acres. I am not suggesting that each man be given one and one-half fields through a give-away land reform program; rather, I suggest that the abolition of the split-farming system will bring about a social reorientation toward greater village unity and responsibility. The clan village seems to have been broken forever, and actually this may be desirable in the light of recent events in Afghanistan. The importance of land tenure to social systems is well expressed by Warriner: "Land systems determine social attitudes, social satisfaction. They are interwoven with national tradition, even with national character."[9]

Since 1946, an American engineering company, Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., has constructed two large dams and a series of canals, which were completed in the spring of 1953. When in full operation this project is designed to reclaim for cultivation 640,000 acres of arid semi-desert west of and south of Kandahar. The Kajakai Dam north of Girishk on the Helmand River is 160 feet high and stores 2,500,000 acre-feet of water in a valley about 32 miles long. The Arghandab Dam on the Arghandab River northwest of Kandahar is 145 feet high and reservoirs 600,000 acre-feet of water.

The plan calls for land to be distributed by the Central Government; the farmers to be subsidized until they can pay for the land titles. In practice, distribution may follow the old spoils system. Latest rumors indicate that about 500 nomads have settled on reclaimed land. It is too early, however, to guage the success or failure of the project.

Two large segments of the Afghan population will be directly affected when the scheme is in full operation: the

9. D. Warriner, *Land Reform and Economic Development,* National Bank of Egypt Fiftieth Anniversary Commemoration Lectures, Cairo, 1955, p. 2.

sedentary villagers already living on the Helmand-Arghandab riverine plains (mainly Pathans, with some Baluchis near the Iranian border), and the nomadic and semi-nomadic Pathans (such as the bulk of the Ghilzais).

Changing nomadic herdsmen-traders to sedentary farmers is no easy job. Reza Shah's plans for settling the Iranian nomads in the 1920's and 1930's failed almost completely, because nomads do not happily forsake the wandering life.

In an example closer to our problem, Abdur Rahman shifted several hundred semi-nomadic Ghilzai families from southern Afghanistan to the Kunduz-Taliqan region of Badakhshan. They settled in permanent villages, separate from the rest of the population, and maintained their flocks of sheep, goats, and camels, grazing them on the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush foothills. In spite of the facade of domestication, many Ghilzai clan and family groups migrate to West Pakistan each fall via the Panjshir River valley, Khawak Pass, and the Kabul River valley, returning in the spring to their permanent homes and resident kinsmen. These migrations are a combination search for winter pastures and trading expeditions. Our American Museum group encountered several Ghilzai caravans going south through the Panjshir valley in September, 1950.

The resident Pathan villagers of the Helmand-Arghandab river valleys present problems of a different order. If large groups of nomads are settled among the farmers trouble will naturally follow, in a land where the blood feud governs kinship relations and life-expectancy patterns.

The question of land ownership will be crucial. If—as the plan says—the reclaimed land can be individually purchased by the tillers and paid for over a number of years, many current tenant farmers and sharecroppers will want farms of their own. Such a desertion to greener fields probably would not be tolerated by large landholders. This accounts for my earlier statement that the new farms may be parcelled out along the old spoils system.

A more pressing problem concerns the actual physical presence of the dams and their effect on the present farming cycle. For example, if 2,000 acre-feet of water are released at the Arghandab Dam, and the villagers south of the dam have not been fully instructed as to when and what is going to happen, the results could be disastrous, especially since this is a potential malaria and yellow fever epidemic area.

The danger of flooded fields is always present because the farmers block off irrigation ditches leading to their fields when the day's work is done. A sudden shift in the stream level causes the blocked water to rise and back-up into adjacent fields. Flooded areas must be drained by ditching, causing losses in time and crops. Deliberate blocking of irrigation ditches and diverting the water into the field of an enemy are favorite methods of retaliation for a real or imagined grievance. This happened to the headman's field while we were in Badwan, and the culprit was never identified.

Our hypothetical 2,000 acre-feet of water could obviously disrupt the farming cycle of whole villages, as well as lay breeding grounds for mosquitos, without proper briefing at the peasant-farmer level.

The Future: The long-term results of the irrigation-land reclamation project could possibly follow this pattern:

First and foremost, a food surplus will be created for Afghanistan. Part of this surplus can be exported, giving a more favorable import-export balance. The rest of the surplus can be used to support more specialists in the towns and cities. Present plans call for the gradual installation of cement plants, automotive body plants, sugar refineries, more textile mills and cotton gins, as well as improving communications, transport facilities, schools, hospitals, and developing the important petroleum resources reported to exist in northern Afghanistan. The food surplus and increased urbanization will probably cause a rise in birthrate sufficient to handle the need for more specialists to operate the new commercial and later industrial economy.

The above outline assumes that sooner or later the central government will be able to persuade most Afghan nomads to become sedentary agriculturists or dairy farmers. And more important, it assumes the government will be able to explain to the Badwanis and other villagers how to use the surplus water, what new methods of farming and crops are available to them, and so on. The problems are limitless. The solving of them may take decades; probably no one in our lifetime will see an industrialized Afghanistan.

How does the clan disintegration in villages like Badwan fit into this picture? This very weakness of clan loyalty and obligation will probably make social adjustments to commercialization easier for the peasant tenant farmer. The intense individual competition fostered by an expanding urban society tends to destroy—or at least weaken—all kinship ties outside the basic family, and even this feels the strain.

The clan feeling among the nomads is still strong, as is the feeling of group unity, obligation and responsibility. Such outlooks are important to the discipline and success of the annual migration. Therefore, attempts to settle the nomads will be met with strong group action against settlement. However, such villagers as the Badwanis can be more easily converted to a more intensified agricultural scheme because they are already sedentary farmers.

Afghanistan is just beginning to peek into its own potential. The Central Government can develop its resources, natural and human, only through patience with its people and cooperation with other nations, both those surrounding her and her overseas customers.

Field Methods and Techniques

The Well-Informed Informant*

Kurt W. Back[1]

Interviewing situations can be classified according to the interest which is centered in the interviewee himself. On the one extreme, in clinical interviews, the purpose is to understand the respondent, to explore the interrelationships of his reactions. In opinion survey interviewing, a person is selected as a representative of a population, but *his* attitudes and opinions are important and he is the only one who can give them. In surveys of factual information, such as census or consumer data, certain facts about the interviewee are wanted in order to derive figures for the total population. Here the data are not necessarily obtained from the interviewee; for instance, age and income can be obtained from records. But the data, however they are obtained, must be about the person himself if an accurate picture of the total distribution is to be found. Finally, in some types of interviewing the interest lies in the information only, not in the interviewee. If the information can be obtained more easily some other way, by looking up a book or by direct observation, so much the better. The function of the interview is only that of obtaining facts which, because of lapse of time, distance, attempts at secrecy or other reasons, are not available for direct observation.

Turning our attention to the interviewee, we can easily see that different qualities are necessary for a successful interview of each type to result. On the one end, as long as the interest centers in the interviewee himself, the principal criterion is whether he is an appropriate subject to study. Thus in a clinical interview (for research purposes) the interviewee should represent the condition which is the subject of the study; in survey interviews he should be representative of the population under investigation, and this problem leads to a selection of interviewees through an efficient and consistent sample design. On the other end of our classification the interviewee must be appraised for his potentialities as transmitter of information. We shall call him *informant,* in distinction to the respondent of the other types of interview.

We can make distinctions even among informants (and the corresponding interviews) according to the degree of complexity of the data required from them. For certain purposes they may be required to do subtle interpretations of relationships, as in some research in cultural anthropology. For others the informant's task consists of describing separate data such as topographic details, buildings, events, or processes, as completely and as objectively as possible. Here again we have a sampling problem. In contrast to survey interviews, however, we do not wish to sample people, but items of information which are available to the informants, and the sampling design should allow us to obtain a maximum of information with a minimum of cost; that is, in general, with the smallest number of interviews or those which are most easily obtainable.[2] In this case it becomes important to identify those informants who will give the most information.

Informants of this kind, who are valued for the number of separate items of information they have to give, are called sometimes, especially in military context, *sources.* This term emphasizes their equivalence to other sources of information, such as documents. We shall use source interchangeably with informant, keeping in mind that by the latter we mean the

* This paper is based on a research program on interviewing methodology at the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University under contract 33(038)-14313 with the Human Resources Institute, Air Research and Development Command, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The research reported here is that of the author and should not be construed as reflecting the view or indorsement of the Department of Air Force. The study was under the overall direction of Lee M. Wiggins, deputy director of the Air Force Project. The planning, execution and analysis of the study was made jointly by all members of the project staff. This may be identified as publication No. A-184 of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University. The author wishes to thank especially the following persons for their major contributions to the subject matter of this paper: Dean Manheimer, who designed the large scale study of the informant; Bernard Levenson, who is responsible for a great part of the analysis; and Joseph A. Precker, who developed and analyzed the perception tests.

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2. This approach to sampling is analogous to that used in modern theories of population sampling, especially sampling proportional to size and double-sampling techniques. Cf. Hansen, M. H., Hurwitz, W. N., and Madow, W. I.: *Sampling Survey Methods and Theory,* Vol. I, New York, 1953, Wiley.

well-informed informant and not the interpretive informant of some anthropological interviews.[3]

The use of sources is important in many types of data collection, and forms the basis of much research work in anthropology, economics and current history, besides more practical applications in fields like credit investigation, journalism, marketing, law and military intelligence. All these fields, therefore, share a common concern in the selection of good informants.

The following discussion of the qualities of the good source is based on a study of a foreign area research operation of the U.S. Air Force in Germany and Japan. In Air Force units a great number of informants, among them Germans, East Europeans and Japanese were interviewed. Tests results and background data of the informants were related to ratings of the informants by the interviewer and the information obtained in the interviews. The over-all results of the study lead to a consistent view of the informant's job and the potentialities of different types of people as informants.

The Informant's Job

The informant acts as a transmitter of information from the original facts *in natura* to the interviewer. This job therefore divides itself into collecting, retaining, and transmitting information.

Collecting Information. The first "task" of an informant is to get himself into a position to learn important facts to observe, to abstract relevant categories from the situation. The difficulty of this "task" is that the prospective informant is not aware at the time that he is performing it. A person visiting a village will be concerned with finding food and lodging, and the details of the structure of the buildings form only a background of his experience, although they may later be the topic of an interview with an anthropologist. Similarly, the prospective witness may be going about his own business while an incident occurs about which he will later be put on the stand. A person who is to become a good informant must investigate actively the background of his experience and keep important aspects separate from his own connections with them.

Retaining Information. After obtaining the information, the future informant must remember it until it is needed. One important factor in memory is the time lapse between absorption of the data and the need for recall, and also the way in which the intervening time was spent. The informant who has had good conditions for memory will naturally be superior to the one who has not. On the other hand, the same factors which controlled the original reception of information are still effective throughout the period. For instance, the person who saw in the details of buildings only a background to his own comfort will remember them in more and more general terms as time goes on. A person who was interested in the structures as such will keep remembering them as distinct features. Apart from extraneous circumstances, therefore, the informant who was good as collector of information will be good at retaining it.

Transmitting Information. A person who has been able to absorb and retain information is of potential value if he is going to be interviewed. For practical purposes, of course, only that part of the information is valuable which is transmitted to the interviewer. This task is the transmission of information, or communication. An informant will be effective during the interview to the degree to which he presents the relevant data, organizes them in a way to fit the needs of the interview, and makes himself understood. He needs an understanding of the situation and a facility for organizing the material, abilities usually associated with intelligence. The informant is helped by abilities more specific to communication. Speaking a common language with the interviewer may seem too trivial to mention, but it becomes an important problem in operations in many countries, and in considering informants speaking strange dialects. Under many conditions more advanced skills may be required, for instance, ability to read and interpret maps and drawings or—if part of the interview must be in writing—literary, sketching and drawing ability. High qualifications in all these fields make the interview easy and efficient. Their lack does not make the informant completely useless (as lack of original knowledge would) but it puts a burden on the interviewer. If this burden becomes too big, it may not be worthwhile, as time and expense become prohibitive.

Motivation. While the emphasis of the discussion concerning the source's job has been on ability, his motivation plays a considerable role, too. Both the strength and the basis of the motivation are important. A person may want to give information for different reasons, for instance, because he believes in the purpose of the interview or because of ulterior aims. If his motives are not directed toward the interview itself, other activities not conducive to good transmission may enter. For instance, if payment for time spent is an important motive, irrelevant talking would be an appropriate activity, while making concise statements would not. Even an increase in strength of motivation would not improve the performance in this case.

The Traits of the Good Informant

The value of a person as an informant depends on the answers to these questions: What does he know? How can he tell it? Does he want to tell it? In other words, we want to predict his knowledgeability, the availability of the information, and his motivation. The study referred to above gives some answers to these questions.

Knowledgeability. The informant's knowledgeability can be inferred from three types of variables. First, a person must have been physically exposed to the information which is desired. In other words, from data about a person's past experience, it can be inferred that he had an opportunity to acquire the data. Generally, the informant must be the kind of a person who would have taken advantage of the oppor-

3. On informants of the other kind, cf. Mead, M. and Metraux, Rh., *The Study of Culture at a Distance*, 1953, U. of Chicago Press, especially Part IV, Rh. Metraux, "Work with Informants."

tunity. This aspect can be called effective exposure. Finally, the problem remains whether he has the perceptual ability to obtain the information.

Physical exposure. We can take for granted that there is some rational basis for assuming that an informant had at least some exposure to topics of interest. The main question is the effect of length and recency of exposures.

We would expect that a person will be able to give more information the longer he has stayed in an area. Indeed, among the sources who had been in the area less than two years, only 15 percent could give long reports, while 41 percent of those whose stay exceeded seven years could do so, the percentage for intermediate years increasing regularly. The correlation between length of stay and length of report is only .13 which (while significant at the one-percent level) shows that physical exposure by itself is not decisive in determining the amount of useful information.

On the basis of experiments in psychological laboratories we might expect that the accuracy of a report declines with the passage of time. This is, however, not borne out here. The reports were rated for accuracy by experts on the areas. The percentage rated "mostly accurate" was 51 percent for those experiences which dated back one to two years, and 50 percent for those reporting seven-year old experiences. The pattern of the intermediate years is irregular and the correlation is virtually zero (—.008).

Length and recency of exposure present a limiting condition on the value of the informant, but they can easily be overshadowed in importance by the informant's own efforts.

Effective exposure. The best indicator of the use of exposure possibilities was found to be interest. This was measured by an interest questionnaire consisting of two parts: mechanical (divided into subtests of design and analysis, construction and outdoor work, and working with tools), and social interest (divided into subtests of research, informal relations, and supervision).[4] It seems reasonable to suppose that the more interested person will take advantage of a chance to learn new facts. It was surprising to find, however, that the deciding factor was not the subject matter of the interview. The principal content of the interview is simple "hardware" facts, such as location and construction details of buildings, description of machines and factory processes. Among the subtests designed to measure mechanical interest, not the questions relating closest to these topics (working with tools and construction), but the set of questions toward more abstract mechanical interest (design and analysis), proved to be the best predictors of a good informant. Further, the questions designed to measure human and social relations topics (the social interest test) related to the informant's ability as well as, if not better than, the mechanical interest test and the questions relating to supervisory interest, in observing and managing people's actions, seemed to be an excellent indicator.

Because of the importance of education—discussed below—it may be suspected that general interest is really an expression of intelligence and education. The correlations of the interest tests with education are quite small, however, (e.g. .04 for mechanical design, .21 for interest in supervision), and can certainly not account for the whole relationship between the source's interest and the evaluation of his collection ability by the interviewer. In fact, among informants with equal education the effect of interest on performance is preserved, except among the group with the highest education, the University graduates.

It is suggested, therefore, that a general factor of interest is more important for a person to use his exposure opportunities than interest in a given area. A generally interested person is more likely to abstract facts from his daily experience and thus have more relevant knowledge than the person with less interest. Interest seems to be an indicator of the capacity to abstract significant features of the background of his experience, which has been indicated as a basic requirement for the collection of information.

The occupational background of good informants confirms the conclusion derived from the interest test. Again, persons in occupations where abstract interests are stressed—students, professionals, and clerical workers—are superior to those with more one-sided, though mechanical, interest—skilled or semi-skilled mechanics. On the bottom of the list we find farmers and unskilled laborers.

Perceptual Abilities. The principal instruments for measuring the perceptual abilities of informants were two tests, Gottschaldt and Picture Recall Tests. The Gottschaldt is a standard test, designed to measure ability for perceptual reorganization.[5] This means that a person scoring high on this test has the ability to isolate details which may be hidden in a pattern. The Picture Recall test was designed especially for this study; it measures the ability to perceive accurately features of pictures corresponding to the content of the interviews.

Both tests proved useful in predicting the interviewer's evaluation of the informant and the amount of information collected in the interview. In contrast to the other measures of the informant, which relate higher to the interviewer's ratings than to the measures of information collected, these tests correlate about equally with both criteria. Of all informant characteristics, perceptual ability shows effects which seem to be little attenuated by the subsequent handling of the information.

The equal effectiveness of the two tests as predictors leads to conclusions similar to those from the study of the interest

4. This test was based on the Brainard Interest Questionnaire. The permission of the Psychological Corporation to adapt and translate it is gratefully acknowledged. The test as used consisted of 15 questions on mechanical and 10 questions on social interests. Typical questions were:

Would you like to sketch and cut out patterns in paper or wood for furniture, or for parts of some machine (mechanical-design)?

Would you like to shape metal or wood with lathe, drill, router, bandsaw, snips, chisel, file, or other tools or machines (mechanical-working with tools)?

Would you like to help others to settle their quarrels and advise how to prevent further troubles (social-informal relations)?

The questions were answered on a five-point scale ranging from "dislike very much" to "like very much."

5. Cf. Thurstone, L. L., *A Factual Study of Perception,* Chicago, 1944, University of Chicago Press.

test. The Gottschaldt test, which measured perceptual ability independent of particular conditions, was as good a measure as the Picture Recall test which was more appropriate to the situation. Again, the general ability to perceive details, to abstract them from a complex background, is related to performance as much as the ability to deal with features presumably close in topical content.

Availability of Information. The abilities of the informants connected with availability or ease of communication may be different from those connected with the ability to collect information. In order to study the abilities separately, two indices of informant quality were constructed from the interviewers' ratings, one of observation and the other of reporting ability. These two measures were highly correlated, showing either that interviewers could not distinguish between the two aspects (partly because they could evaluate an informant's observation only by his reporting the data) or that similar abilities contribute to success in both performances. The prediction for each criterion cannot be definitely separated. Assignment of variables to either criterion is somewhat arbitrary, depending partly on rational considerations and partly on supporting evidence.

An informant who can transmit his knowledge easily has the data well organized, well remembered, and well verbalized. Higher education prepares students to treat information in this way. In fact, the principal background factor associated with informant ability was education, essentially that minimum amount equivalent to a partial U.S. college education. The college degree, or its local equivalent, turned out to be virtual insurance against an unsuccessful interview. Some of this superiority is certainly due to ability to obtain information, especially as education is related to interest. It is likely, however, that the major part of the influence of education on informant performance lies in the learning of reporting abilities — namely memory — organization of material, and verbal facility.

This hypothesis receives support from observation of the interview itself. Here virtually the only influential difference between informants was education. The well-educated informant gives more information, gives it faster, and is more certain of his data than the less-educated one. In observing the process of interviewing, one does measure more the reporting ability than mere possession of information.

Motivation. Within the limits imposed by the informant's abilities and, usually, the self-selection due to the voluntary nature of the interview, motivation influences performances. Frequently these limits are so narrow that major emphasis should be given to abilities, but it is useful to look at motivation in any case. The interviewers rated the principal motivation of the informants and this could then be related to performance. The informant whose own motives were in closest agreement with the purpose of the interview was found to contribute the best data. This is the informant who is interested in the purpose of the research, or who under certain conditions, may want to help the legal or military aims. Next comes the informant who sees in the interview an enjoyable experience in which he can talk to an eager listener or otherwise inflate his ego. At the lowest extreme stands the informant who wants to be interviewed for his own ulterior aims—money, other favors, or satisfaction of curiosity. Based on this motive, he may give much information, but it will be of little value. In short, the more an informant accepts the aims of the interview, the more he will try to arrange his knowledge in a useful way and a more fruitful interview will result.

Selection of Informants

In a number of situations many informants are interviewed and even more potential sources are available. Selection becomes necessary and the best selection scheme will get the most information for a minimum of time, effort and expense. In these cases knowledge of the characteristics of the good informant is of great importance.

With minimum data about the potential informants available, the investigator can use such factors as education and occupation. They relate to both the informant's ability to collect information and to report it, and therefore give a fair prediction of success in the interview.

If more time is available and a more elaborate system can be used, short tests of interest and of perceptual ability can be employed. Their application will result in refinement of the selection procedure, which should outweigh the added burden of administering a testing program.

Although selection of motivation is somewhat difficult, a certain amount of involuntary selection on this basis occurs through the recruiting procedures. Although promise of pay may be effective in getting informants to come, it may draw the more undesirable type of informant. Appeals based on the purpose of the study, though difficult at first, may give better results in the long run.

The generality of the findings, and also of the recommendations for informant selection, can only be tested by further experience. It is significant to note, however, that the delineation of informant abilities was based on different types of approaches, under different conditions, and in different cultures. It may be expected with some confidence, therefore, that the main relationships will hold up in further replications.

Reviews of the Literature

The Psychology of Politics, by H. J. Eysenck; Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1955, $6.00, pp. xvi, 317.

Political theorists have at all times regarded their subject matter as one area of human behavior, and many of them have searched for the psychological laws which would best explain and predict what happens in politics, and also what ought to happen. These attempts have produced some of the narrowest and most distorted theories of human motivation and behavior, as in Hobbes's grand system, in Rousseau's, in Utilitarianism. Spokesmen for the irrational forces, from Mandeville to Bagehot and to some latter day authors, have erred as much through lack of thoroughness, as the rationalists did through excessive confidence in building comprehensive systems. Such diverse writers and statesmen, however, as Machiavelli, Burke, Tocqueville, J. S. Mill and Graham Wallas have left posterity invaluable observations and analyses of the motives and sentiments which influence politics, and on how they operate. The work of any one of them, or all of them together with yet others, could, perhaps, justly be presented for study as a psychology of politics. Yet, if the model of scientific discipline is the mensurational method and reproduceable experiment employed in the physicist's laboratory, then the body of political psychology built up by generations of historians, lawyers, philosophers and statesmen, is not science.

Professor Eysenck would certainly not lack support, if he cared to make this challenge explicit. He prefers to ignore all that has passed before as psychology of politics, and to establish a foundation for his own contribution, wherever he can find one that meets his requirements. Psychologists with a bent towards quantification and statistical analysis, have tapped the world of politics through two channels: public opinion polling and social attitude measurement. Both are problems of considerable interest in contemporary societies with their elective governments and various party systems. They may not exhaust all or even a very large segment of the psychology of politics, but they undoubtedly belong there. Most of the work done in this field has originated and has been reported in the U.S. In judging Eysenck's detailed presentation of various studies done by American workers, the reader must bear in mind that this book was written primarily for the British public, which has no easy access to the journals or textbooks in social psychology. The American reader will, however, welcome the supplementation of these reports with accounts of some unpublished studies conducted by Eysenck's students, more particularly, perhaps, of research done with a sample of Communists, a population at present not easily available for attitude research in this country.

Entering the field of politics, Eysenck follows the same research design which has rewarded his factorial analysis with a dimensional structure of personality. Out of the complexity of opinions and attitudes, he emerges with an elegant two-factorial pattern and a hierarchical structure. His reasoning is based on the observation that political views are not held in any random combination, that people in favor of certain measures will also tend to approve others and to oppose yet another set of opinions. As the specific response in personality structure, so the specific opinion lies at the base of the pyramid which, above the intermediate levels of habitual opinion and attitude, culminates in ideology. As personality can be normal, neurotic, or psychotic, so ideology can be radical or conservative, and as neurotics or normals differ according to their position on the introversion-extraversion scale, so do conservatives or radicals according to their place along the dimension of tough-mindedness vs. tender-mindedness. Eysenck's analysis of other workers' as well as of his own research in attitudes leads to the conclusion that the pattern and relationship of social attitudes is most meaningfully demonstrated within a two-factional framework. A single dimension, like authoritarianism, causes confusion, but so does a multiplication of factors. The two factors which are necessary and adequate are conservatism-radicalism and one which, borrowing a term from William James, Eysenck calls tender-mindedness versus tough-mindedness. The latter, however, is not an ideological dimension, but "the projection on the social attitude field of a set of personality variables." In fact, following Guilford's factorial sub-division, it would appear that tough-mindedness is a projection of the extraverted, and tender-mindedness a projection of the introversed personality type. The table of factor saturations presented in support of this argument, however, also follows for a different interpretation. But more important than the actual identity of these two factors, is the hypothesis that the T-factor is a function of temperamental variables of personality, which in turn are primarily genetically determined. The implications of Eysenck's model which is also linked to Mowrer's earlier two-factor theory of learning, should not prove too difficult to test. Position on the ideological dimension is the result of learning and consequently can be changed by new learning. One's place on the T-factor, however is determined by heredity or early conditioning, and therefore irreversible. All one has to discover is whether people indeed change their opinions more readily concerning private property and nationalization of economic resources, than they do on issues of religious education or of sexual ethics.

It would be unfair to Eysenck to overstress that which is his most novel though probably not most important suggestion, i.e. the possible hereditary influence in political as well as other behavior. He advances it tentatively, and his two-factorial model does not depend on it, or even on an association with a two-factional theory of learning. On the other hand, Eysenck would not like the reader to ignore his message that the operation of common genetic factors ought to be tested as an alternative hypothesis to the more common assumption that personality is molded primarily through early socializing. He himself may have neglected the developmental aspects of personality and ideology because so many others pay attention to them, even though much of the work on social attitudes has been concerned with how to change them. It would be ungrateful to complain that the results of this body of research have not been adequately incorporated in Eysenck's theory, for his achievement in integrating so many other discrete sets of findings into a single model is most impressive. Perhaps a revised edition will allow for

some departure from his rigidly structural analysis. It may be hoped that in the meantime the hypotheses implied in Eysenck's theory are being tested in Britain and in the other countries where responses to attitude questionnaires are reported to be in line with his two-factional model. A more detailed account of these studies than a mere reference would be a welcome addition, but even more interesting would be an analysis of such discordant findings as one expects to obtain in countries with different political systems and traditions. A new edition would also benefit by a revision of the index which at present is rather like a random sample of references, and of the bibliography which, though avowedly not meant to be complete, might, perhaps, include among its 500 odd titles the names of Freud, McDougall and Fromm, or at least those authors who are quoted in the text. One particularly striking omission is that of *The Authoritarian Personality,* for a section of the Californian study is discussed over several pages of the book. An American edition of the book should also provide footnotes to explain what such abbreviations as L.C.C. or W.E.A. stand for. Meanwhile we can but speculate about the possible impact of Eysenck's most recent challenge, on political thinking. Will it be quoted for its scientific methodology or its static model?

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Causes of Industrial Peace Under Collective Bargaining, by Clinton S. Golden and Virginia D. Parker, eds.; Harper and Brothers, New York, 1955, pp. xiv, 369, $4.75.

In 1946, strike activity in the United States had reached an all-time high, with strikes idling some 4,600,000 workers for a total of 116 million man-days, and the public had become increasingly concerned with the pathological aspects of industrial relations. Even in 1946, however, direct time lost because of strikes amounted to less than 1.5 percent of estimated working time. Convinced, therefore, that the extent and seriousness of industrial conflict was being overemphasized, Clinton Golden, Executive Director of the Trade Union Program at Harvard, suggested to the National Planning Association that it was time to put industrial conflict in proper perspective by calling attention to the healthy aspects of industrial relations, and that it should try to "discover how much much peace there is and what makes peace."

The present volume is the outgrowth of that suggestion. The National Planning Association, as is generally known, concentrated its inquiry on the causes rather than the extent of industrial peace under collective bargaining, and sought to determine these causes by means of case studies of situations in which labor and management were deemed to have achieved "successful and peaceful" industrial relations. A number of leading industrial relations scholars, working under NPA auspices, analyzed the experience of some 30 "medium-sized" firms (i.e., neither industrial giants, nor firms with less than 1,000 employees) selected from the aircraft, chemicals, clothing, electrical goods, food processing, glass, machine tools, mining, pulp and paper, rubber, steel, and textile industries. These investigations resulted in the publication, between 1947 and 1953, of some 13 case studies and a concluding report. That report and condensations of the case studies are now brought together in one convenient volume, whose publication provides an appropriate occasion to review the NPA project in its entirety.

Because there is as yet no standard concept of the term industrial peace, the reader should realize that the NPA is seeking the causes of a specific kind of industrial peace, which it defines as a "relationship between two groups—industrial management and organized labor—in which both coexist with each retaining its institutional sovereignty, *working together with reasonable harmony in a climate of mutual respect and confidence.*" (p. 8; italics added).

Given this concept of industrial peace, what are the ingredients necessary for its achievement? Without disparaging the importance of the investigations reported here, the conclusion seems self-evident: that industrial peace is most likely to be found where there are a minimum of factors leading to industrial conflict. And indeed, the studies themselves furnish abundant evidence of this point. The firms to which these cases are devoted are generally well-insulated from troublesome external forces, operating for the most part under conditions of relatively stable production, expanding markets, and moderate labor costs; they are thus protected against some of the economic stresses and strains most likely to embitter industrial relations.

While it may facilitate peace, as Clark Kerr points out, favorable environment alone cannot produce peace. Equally clear, however, is the fact that in the absence of a favorable economic and political climate, the possibilities of achieving the sort of working harmony envisioned here are quite remote. Kerr has reported elsewhere compelling evidence of the effect of *unfavorable* environment on industrial relations. In an essay on "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike—An International Comparison,"[1] Kerr and Siegel point out that industrial discord rather than peace is an international characteristic of such industries as mining, longshoring, and lumbering, and that this may be attributed in large part to the fact that they share economic circumstances so unfavorable as to virtually preclude the achievement of industrial peace. These, of course, are extreme cases. Whether or not a favorable environment is in fact a *sine qua non* of industrial peace is a question still to be answered.

In fairness to the authors, however, it should be pointed out that they consider industrial peace to be something more than simply the neutral state of no conflict. They prefer to regard it as possessing a positive quality, of being a constructive and creative influence in the labor-management relationship. The study, in short, is less concerned with the environmental determinants of peace than with the question of whether there are "operational" factors—conscious acts or decisions, which when applied or called into play at the right moment, in a permissive environment, can turn conflict into cooperation. To put it bluntly, the study is intended to provide a sophisticated and advanced how-to-do-it manual for the labor leader or business executive who wants to know what he can *do* to promote industrial peace.

1. See Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur Ross, eds., *Industrial Conflict,* McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1954, pp. 189-212.

The basic proposal for achievement of this goal is to put into practice the nine basic rules for industrial peace distilled from the case studies (p. 47):

1. "Full acceptance by management of collective bargaining . . . and of unionism as an institution. The company considers a strong union an asset to management.

2. The union fully accepts private ownership and operation of the industry; it recognizes that the welfare of its members depends upon the successful operation of the business.

3. The union is strong, responsible and democratic.

4. The company stays out of the union's internal affairs; it does not seek to alienate the workers' allegiance to their union.

5. Mutual trust and confidence exist between the parties. There have been no serious ideological incompatibilities.

6. Neither party to bargaining has adopted a legalistic approach to the solution of problems in the relationship.

7. Negotiations are problem-centered — more time is spent on day-to-day problems than on defining abstract principles.

8. There is widespread union-management consultation and highly developed information sharing.

9. Grievances are settled promptly, in the local plant wherever possible. There is flexibility and informality within the procedure."

Let me now turn to some of the broader issues raised by the book. One purpose of the study was to attempt to allay public concern over the extent of industrial conflict. Given this goal, there is some question, it seems to me, as to whether the decision to study average size firms was a sound one. To be sure, they are subject to none of the unique problems of the very large or very small firm, and in this sense, they afford a good cross-section of industrial relations problems. But to confine the study to such firms overlooks the fact that it is conflict between unions and the industrial giants that is of major concern to the public. Steel srikes, auto strikes and coal strikes, each one involving tens or hundreds of thousands of workers—these are the ones that stir up public alarm; these are the ones that produce demands for conflict-regulating legislation.[2] Even the Bureau of Labor Statistics, it may be noted, has in the past issued special reports dealing solely with strikes involving 10,000 workers or more. In view of these facts, might it not have been more appropriate to concentrate at least some attention on the problems of securing industrial peace among the pattern setting labor-management relationships?

I find a second source of criticism in the fact that the study appears to have been undertaken with the implicit assumption that conflict has only negative value in our society, that industrial conflict is essentially eradicable, and that such industrial conflict as exists (where the industrial environment is favorable) has roots which go no deeper than the labor-management relationship. Each of these assumptions, I believe, is open to serious question.

Robert Dubin, in a recent essay on the "Constructive Aspects of Industrial Conflict,"[3] makes the point that under collective bargaining, industrial conflict is so channelled and regulated that its essential purpose is "to establish a new basis of order, not to continue disorder," and that fundamentally industrial conflict thus institutionalized becomes a means for systematic social change. It has long been recognized too, that in some situations, at least, industrial conflict serves as a stimulus to management to seek ways and means of improving efficiency and of investing in labor-saving devices. We may legitimately ask, then, whether it might be possible to become *too* successful in the achievement of industrial peace, and whether if the goal visualized by Mr. Golden should become generally realized, a major force for economic change and industrial progress might not be dissipated.

Again we challenge the concept which appears to underlie the thinking of some contributors to this book, that industrial conflict is essentially the product of in-plant ignorance or ill-will, and that it could be scourged from the bosom of the body industrial if only sweetness and light were to prevail. Even economists are aware today that the personal aspects of industrial conflict are not simply the products of intramural issues, but that labor unrest may often be the result of conflict rooted in non-industrial sources and carried into the plant. A basic, and as I see it, inescapable cause of conflict in modern society is the fact that as a nation we insist upon making a virtue of frustration and discontent, by imbuing the individual, from childhood, with the belief that he must get ahead, economically, socially or otherwise, and thus, implicitly, that he must never allow himself to become content with his station or role in life, but push, struggle and pursue a perpetual conflict with the rest of society to improve his position relative to them. So long as this condition prevails, how can we expect to eliminate industrial conflict by even the most diligent application of the formula enunciated here?

Lest someone accuse me of being a hopeless pessimist, or (even worse!) an economic determinist, let me say that although I remain unconvinced that we have reached "first down and goal to go" so far as industrial peace is concerned, it is nevertheless true, particularly in the past 20 years, that we have made vast strides in reducing the severity and destructive aspects of industrial conflict, that industrial management and organized labor have acquired much maturity, understanding and tolerance in their relationships with each other, and that on the continuum between industrial warfare and industrial peace, the pointer has moved significantly toward the peaceful end of the scale. Whether we can, and whether we should move to the point suggested here, where "both institutional groups have largely, but voluntarily become integrated into an increasing democratized enterprise" (p. 9), or whether the limits of practical movement fall substantially short of this stage is a question the answer to which must be left to the judgment of the reader.

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2. For a thorough study of this point, see Neil Chamberlain, *Social Responsibility and Strikes*, Harper & Bros., N.Y., 1953, pp. 71 ff.

3. See *Industrial Conflict, op. cit.*, p. 46.

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